Vermont Legislature SmartTranscripts:

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Go live.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Welcome back to the House Judiciary Committee this Friday afternoon before town meeting break, February 7. We're we had an introduction to h H772 before we broke for lunch. And now we're going to move to a walkthrough with Cameron. So

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: if you could join us, Cameron. And

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: just by way of a further introduction before you get started. Our work on this bill is a drive by of the areas that are within our jurisdiction, essentially our lane. I know that folks are gonna want to discuss lots of other things in the bill. But since we have very limited time, I wanna make sure that we're trying to stick for a lane, which essentially is court process, the impacts on the court of this, and any kind of due process concerns if we identify due process or constitutional concerns. I don't think there are the latter, certainly wanna look at due process, court process, and we will look at that. So there are gonna be sections that Cameron will kind of give us an overview, but I think you'll note the areas that are really our focus. I will remind people, and that also goes with testimony of witnesses, really want to focus on those areas. Because whether we agree in this committee with this bill one way or another, That's not really our focus at this point. If we have other issues with this bill, we can take it up with the votes general committee that did pass it out eight to three yesterday. But but we're gonna really try to stick to to to our lane because they've spent several weeks trying to find compromise as I think representative Bartell mentioned. So with that, I Bartley. Bartley. Bartley. Sorry. No. Bartley. Cameron, over to you. Welcome to the committee. Yes, sir. Nice to

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: have you here.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Goodnow. It's nice to be here. For the record, Cameron Wood, Office of Legislative Council. I think this is my first time being in this committee in this capacity. I've been with the office now. This is my second year in this capacity. But I clerked for Legislative Counsel around ten years ago. And at one point, I interned under the esteemed Michelle Childs. So I'm very fortunate. Did you probably cut that piece out of the video and send it to her? Send it to you. You guys can cut it out. For those who don't know, I cover many areas, including consumer protection, bankruptcy, retirements, and pensions. But I also cover one of the primary areas of my portfolio is housing. And so that's why landlord tenants, you get the pleasure of dealing with me. So happy to walk through the proposal of amendment from the House General Committee. And if it's Okay with everyone, I'll share my screen. And then we'll start to walk through. This is a 33 page draft amendment, and it has quite a lot of changes to the residential rental agreement chapter in Title IX. This is the chapter that governs most of your standard landlord tenant relations, if you will. I'm gonna highlight a few things. As mister chair, you mentioned, I won't go through every single section, but there are a few things here that I need to highlight and walk through with you because it really does set the basis for when we get to the ejectment chapter and dealing with the the judicial system when you actually need to eject someone from a a dwelling unit. So for starters, just understand that there's a two step process when you're talking about removing an individual tenant from a dwelling unit. For starters, the landlord has to terminate the residential rental agreement. That is the first step. And there is a section that I will have to walk through in detail with you all. It talks about the time frames and how a landlord goes about and for what reasons a landlord can terminate a rental agreement. From there, if an individual tenant remains in the dwelling unit after the termination date of the rental agreement, the landlord then has to bring the ejectment action in court to go through that process before you could get to a final judgment that the sheriff would deliver. And then ultimately, if the person continues to stay after that point, remove the individual from the property. So I just wanna highlight there's kind of two really key pieces to hone in on throughout this whole process. The termination and what you're terminating for, and if you're complying with the notice requirements. And then separate from that, if the individual remains at that point after the termination, having to bring that into court. So I'm going to start with page one. So section one, this entire section is amending the chapter related to residential rental agreements. But the first piece to hone in on is the definition of actual notice. This is key because when you're providing that termination notice to the tenant, you have to do it by providing quote, actual notice. And that's defined here as meaning receipt of the written notice. The first two key pieces there has to be in writing, and the individual tenant has to actually receive it. Currently, the statute says written either hand delivered or mailed. Those are the two options. And what this amendment will do is add additional options to how actual notice can be provided. Starting with the sub two, can be delivered by share of service. And I would say I don't think there's anything right now prohibiting that from occurring. So this is just adding in something that could already be done by hand delivered. It doesn't say it has to be hand delivered by the landlord. So adding delivered by share of service, and then you have in the Sub 3 mailed to

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: the last known address or the address provided in the

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: residential rental agreement, or would be emailed to an email address included in the lease agreement and mailed as described in Subdivision 3. So if you're going to email it, you also then need to mail it. Moving to the top of page two, if the last known address is unknown, then post it on the door of the dwelling unit. So you would only be able to do the quote tack order, if you will, if you didn't have the last address of the individual. And then here we get into sub B. There is a rebuttable presumption that the notice was received. And you could see the amendment here is extending that from three to five days after adding the date the email was sent, if sent via electronic means, the date the notice was posted to the door, or if the sending party proves that the notice was sent first class or certified, the date of the mailing. So again, currently, it's hand deliver or mail. You get a presumption if you mail it first class or certified that the person gets it three days later. It's a rebuttable presumption. And so because they're adding in the capacity to email it or post it, they're adding those into the rebuttable presumption as well. But they are extending that out to five days instead of three.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So was there any discussion there in that whether particularly with respect to the posting and the five days and such, whether that's that's usually calculated to effectuate service. This is one spot that makes me a little bit nervous, if that's considered actual nervous.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: So there was a lot of discussion about the mailing service and its current delays with mailing delivery. There was discussion about if you're going to have email. Some individuals don't always read the email when it comes in. How do you know that they received it? So there was a lot of discussion about that. And I think the committee wanted to extend it out to five days with some of that under consideration. But the committee didn't have discussion as far as when I was in the chair about having a separate notice period or a separate rebuttable presumption period if it was posted on the door.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I guess the other related question was whether this follows rule four of the civil rules and civil procedure. This tracks that or not.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I haven't done an exhaustive review of Rule four. What you'll see later on in the bill is there is some changes to when alternate service of process is ordered in the court process or in the objectment chapter. I would say this isn't an actual judicial proceeding at this point in time. This is just the notice from the landlord. So it wouldn't necessarily have to comply with rule four unless you all wanted to incorporate that.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So actual notice as used later in the object subject that is Any

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: notice that would be required in the objectment chapter would have to comply with the rules of civil procedure or the language that's in those sections. Because there are some tweaks. For example, later on when you get to the ejectment, there's a new subchapter, and there's a proposal to require the answer from the complaint within fourteen days, which would be different from the rules currently, which would be twenty one days, generally. So there are a few changes later on as it relates to that. For this piece, at least, there was discussion about whether to try to apply this definition of actual notice to the ejectment chapter. And my recommendation to the committee was I would not do that because then you're really altering the process of how civil cases are handled. And my recommendation would be to not be carving out just for this in that sense. Okay. Well, clarifies it. Kevin, let me

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: Saturday and Sunday included in the five days? Yes, sir.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Unless you specify otherwise, it would be included.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Is this one of this is one

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: the sections that we have, like,

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: that we should be asking about.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Well, I less so now that I understand that this is the clarification that this definition of the notice is is a carrying over and what we've been Yeah.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: That's kinda

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: really where the notice is

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Yeah. That

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: we are

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: concerned with.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Okay. In that case, just very briefly then, delivered by share

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: of service. Any reason not just like service processor, like more broadly anyone who can do service?

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Good question. I did not

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: have an answer. And then the only other one was email to an email address, including lease agreement and mail as described in subdivision, Romanette 3. So if you get the email right, but you get the mail address wrong,

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: would that be considered actual notice? So my understanding of how this would play out and I should back up. I was not part of any conversation about the sheriff and whether to allow it for some other service process. So if the committee had a reasoning for that, I can't answer. That was my reasoning for stating it that way. And keep in mind that the statute requires actual notice, which is receipt. So if rental agreement is terminated and the tenant remains, and then it ultimately gets to an ejectment action in court, the tenant would be able to make the argument into court that they never actually received presumption that the individual receives it. So if you did email and mail, I think the court was keeping both to try to ensure multiple avenues of the information getting to the tenant. If the tenant was able to demonstrate in court that they didn't receive either, the email address was incorrect, and I was not at the location when you mailed it, then that would be an argument they could make in the court. And there are probably others who have more practical knowledge of how that works out in the court system and those arguments that are made who could better answer any other questions that you have.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Great. Thank you.

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: Okay. What about a text?

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I would argue that because it wouldn't comply with one of the subdivisions here under one a, that that would not be sufficient. It would be in writing, but it's required to be hand delivered, delivered, mailed, emailed. And so if it didn't fall under one of those, I would argue it would not be sufficient. So I'm bringing up actual notice because what I'm going to do now is I'm going to move towards the section in the residential rental agreement chapter where we talk about termination because, again, that's really the foundation here before we even get to the ejectment action. These things have to occur. And these can be arguments that are made in the case of the ejectment action, and so that's why I think this is is really relevant. But there are a lot of other changes throughout here related to the rental agreement. I'd be happy to answer potential questions if you have them or to connect with you offline if anyone has questions about what else is in the bill. But I'm going to bring you to this page seven, subsection four thousand four and sixty seven, determination of tenancy and the notice requirement. So currently, this section is set up where most of these subdivisions are about different reasons for terminating a rental agreement. So for example, the subsection A is termination if there's non pickup rents. In each of these sections, there's different termination notice periods that have to be provided. So for example, under current law, if you're terminating for failure to pay rent, you have to provide fourteen days notice. If you're terminating the agreement because of breach of the rental agreement, you have to provide thirty days notice. If you're terminating it because of some sort of criminal activity or activity that threatens other individuals, it's days notice. So there's all these different notice periods. And so I'm bringing that up, and I will just kinda walk through each section quickly because the the time frames are being shortened in some instances and then extended in other instances. So for example, here under the sub A, the landlord may terminate a tenancy for nonpayment of rent by providing there's the actual notice that's required to the tenant on the date at which the tenancy will terminate, which shall be at least ten days after the date in the actual notice. So I don't want to walk through each of these subsections unless you all would find value in that. I'm just bringing it up to highlight that it's going to the notice period that the tenant received is going to depend on what the reason that the individual is terminating the rental agreement for. And I'm pausing on A, and then I'm going to walk through B, because these are going to be relevant to the new ejectment language later on in the ejectment section that is really more in the jurisdiction here of this committee. So as I mentioned of the sub A, termination for failure to pay rent. And then they're adding language or the proposal here is to add language that the landlord may terminate a tenancy under Subdivision B1 for repeated late payment of rent. So when you get to B, currently, this is broken out into two subdivisions one and two, where one is failure to comply with material terms of the rental agreement or with obligations imposed. And two is and this is here midway through page eight when termination is based on criminal activity, illegal drug activity, acts of violence, any of which threaten the health and safety of other residents. The proposal here is to expand under the B-one So the landlord may terminate the tenancy for failure to comply with the material terms, obligations imposed, sub two, repeated late payment of rent, which is more than three times in a twelve month period, or the tenant's refusal to allow a landlord or the landlord's agents access to the dwelling unit in accordance with four thousand four sixty. There's a separate section that talks about when a landlord can actually access the dwelling unit. If the tenant's not allowing access, that falls here.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Barbara, there's a question. So I've got two questions, actually. Can you say more about what the material terms are, I believe? There

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: was

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: some discussion in the committee about this. There are other provisions in the chapter related to obligations of the tenant. The tenant has obligations to pay rent without demand. The tenant has obligations to not damage the dwelling units, not cause any habitability or issues for other tenants and their enjoyment of their units within the premises, for example. So there are certain obligations. And then material terms of the rental agreement could be other things like the lease could say you can't have other people living there. I know a lot of leases say that you can't smoke in the property. I would define

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: that as material terms of the lease agreement. And

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: a chance for Bidisol to allow access, I'd like to understand that better, because if somebody is like, I just had a baby and I don't want landlord to come in and break both insects. Right. Is that can violate them? Or I work nights, and so coming at 8AM is really inconvenient.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I wanna pull up that section. And as a matter of fact, I'll just pull it up here so I can share it with you all. Give me one second. Okay. So the landlord needs the tenant's consent to come in, which the tenant cannot unreasonably withhold. There's only a limited subset of reasons in which the landlord does not need the tenant's consent to enter the dwelling unit. And they're listed here under the sub b. The tenant excuse me. The landlord has to provide a minimum of forty eight hours notice. And with that forty eight hours notice, the landlord could come in to inspect the premises, make necessary or agreed repairs, supply agreed services, or to exhibit the unit for a potential buyer. So in that instance, I would probably defer to maybe some others with better practical expertise if the specific situation, if you're looking for an answer to that, if the landlord is saying, hey, I need to come in. I want to spray for bugs. And the tenant is concerned about the use of whatever material is being used because of that reason, I'm not quite sure exactly how that would play out. But those hours are sort

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: of limited. I'm thinking of a lot of people who have to be at work by 8AM.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: This really isn't part of our jurisdiction? No, no, I understand Malay to understand it and definitely can talk offline on all these. No. Just just to keep us on track. Understand the concerns,

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: and I'm sure that we individually have concerns with all sorts of parts of this. But Okay. So the proposal here under the sub two is to remove the specific references to criminal activity or illegal drug activity and just say that when termination is based on acts of violence, damage to the dwelling unit or premises, or other activity, any of which threatens the health or safety of other residents, and then adding specifically the landlord, landlord's agents, or neighbors, the landlord may terminate for five days notice, so a reduction there from fourteen to five. The actual notice required for this B shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating forth particular facts and the basis thereof in support of the termination, need sufficient details to inform the tenant. And then another piece that was added here is this sub three, where a landlord shall not terminate a rental agreement under this subsection based on a person seeking medical assistance for a drug overdose, being the subject of a good faith request for medical assistance, or being at the scene of a drug overdose or within close proximity to the scene of a drug overdose as provided, moving to the top of page nine and eighteen-four 254. So I'm pausing and doing a little bit of walk through of these two sections in particular. These are what you may hear individuals refer to as, quote, just cause reasons for termination. These are reasons where the tenant isn't complying with some requirement or obligation imposed by the chapter, and therefore, the landlord is moving forward with termination. This is relevant because later on, the proposal in this amendment is to create a new ejectment subchapter for termination based on these factors alone. And that new subchapter has different requirements when it comes to the period per answer and very, I don't want to say shortened, but shorter time frames for the court to hold final hearings and issue judgments, etcetera. So that's why I'm mentioning these, because they're relevant when we get to later. And then the last thing I'm going to mention here is this last piece, the sub three, about persons seeking medical assistance. The intent here was to mirror what's in eighteen forty two-fifty four regarding immunity for certain individuals if they need medical assistance for an overdose. So it's really just mirroring what's there in that section for the criminal speech. Okay.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So just I wanna make sure I'm so it's page eight two a is what is gonna connect to the so cause. Yeah. So why was criminal activity an illegal drug activity in the world? I'm curious. Is that covered? Or is it considered to be covered in other language in here? There was,

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: As far as the discussion that I was aware of when I was in the room, there was concern about individuals potentially having their residential rental agreement terminated based on criminal activity when there may not have actually been some criminal charges brought or a conviction due to criminal activity. There was also concern about with the illegal drug activity, I think there was concern among all of the members wanting to address circumstances where individuals may be dealing drugs out of a unit but didn't necessarily want to have an individual who may simply be a drug user but isn't bothering other individuals. There's discussion about that. And then I think at the end of the day, was comfort among the committee that by removing those two, you're still leaving acts of violence, damage, or other activity. And then from their perspective, the key piece here was it's threatening other people. And so if it's threatening other people, that's really the thing that they were wanting to go after. So if somebody is dealing drugs out of a dwelling unit, I think there's still an argument that you could remove that individual because that activity would threaten other individuals.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: And also presumably there's, getting ahead of myself, the show cause affidavit, the individual landlord isn't gonna be able to say whether it's illegal drug activity or criminal activity for that matter. That was part of presumably can say whether there's been a threat.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: That was part of the discussion throughout this, sir.

[Rep. Karen Dolan (Member)]: Sure. Yeah. And I realize this is setting us up, so I'm trying not to get too into it, but I feel like the timing might be helpful for me to understand. So this is saying if any of those things happen, they can give notice that the tenancy will be terminated, and it has to be at least five days out. But then getting back to the notice, notice is five days. So it could be you get the notice and you find out your lease is done. You are now being

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: right? The way it would work, slightly alter that. Think about it this way. If you're going to mail it, the presumption is the person received it five days later. And then the termination notice, when they receive it five days later, has to give you five days. So it would really be if you're the landlord and you're trying to figure out and calculate, Okay, well, when am I actually terminating this agreement? If I'm going to mail that notice today via certified mail, it's really ten days from now because I have to presume that you're not going to get it for five days. And then if this were to pass with this amendment, you would have an additional five days. So it would be Great. Ended. But the individual may very well only have five days if they do only receive it five days later.

[Rep. Karen Dolan (Member)]: But not zero days. That I mean, not to say five days is great, but it's better than zero days.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Okay.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay,

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: so the next piece in this section, I'm going to just mention one more thing here because it's going to be relevant, is apologies for the scroll here Going to page 13, there's an inclusion of this language here, affirmative defense to an ejectment action. So for any ejectment action based on failure to pay rent, So we're only talking about that. We're only talking about subsection A. It's an affirmative defense of the tenant, and judgment shall be issued for the defendant if there exists a serious health and safety code violation issued to the landlord under 20 BSA 2,677. 20 BSA 2,677 is where the Division of Fire Safety has the authority to issue citations for violations of residential housing codes. So a few years back, you all took the oversight of residential dwelling health and safety codes and put it under the Division of Fire Safety. So they have issued rules that outline what the health and safety codes are required for dwelling units. And so if the Division of Fire Safety has issued a citation under that section and the landlord this is under line 14 the landlord has made no reasonable attempt to correct the violation as of the date of termination, then it would be a defense for not having paid rent.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: What about the protection? So think about

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: it this way. Remember, you have the termination. So let's back up. There's a health and safety violation. You, as the tenant, notify Division of Fire Safety. Division of Fire Safety comes in, issues a citation to the landlord. You have to do this to fix it. Landlord doesn't. Tenant stops paying rent, which the tenant has the legal authority to do under a separate section. The tenant is not obligated to pay rent if there are health violations in the unit. And then the landlord proceeds to terminate the rental agreement because you're not paying rent. And then you stay. The landlord brings the ejectment action against you because you're not paying rent. It's a defense for you as the tenant to point to this section and say you can point to this section and the other section that authorizes you to not pay rent. And you can point to it and say, you landlord took no reasonable steps to fix the citation that you were given. Therefore, judgment shall be issued to the defendant in that case. One of the health and safety issue is

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: such that the health department or another inspector says, you've got to

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: get out now. There is a separate section up here in the termination that says, if the termination is based on a government requirement or a government notice to leave the premises, then the termination is based on that date, whatever date the government puts in. So if the health department comes in and says, you can't live here anymore, then the individual would have to leave. And the landlord could terminate the rental agreement based on that fact. There is no requirement to provide the individual some alternate housing. There's a separate section where the tenant is allowed to not pay rent because of some health violation. They can also pursue damages. So if there's existing law. Yes, sir. So if there's a health and safety violation and the landlord is not doing anything to fix it, then the tenant cannot pay rent. If the tenant ends up having to leave the apartment,

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: they

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: could sue the landlord and seek damages in that event. I don't know how successful that has been in the past. I would, you know, I would defer that question to others. But at least conceptually, it's authorized by the statute.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: And they probably would have been asked to leave. They're the first of I wanna say eviction notice. But but once the landlord got their first warning, if the problem was picking up then, they would have been directed to leave other than potentially the second. Okay,

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: thank you.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Ian, Barbara, Tom.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Does the health safety code identify serious violations and non serious violations? Or is it a subjective thing, there's a violation, and we have to make a determination as whether it's serious or not?

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: It gives this list here. So the list that's in statute says conditions jeopardizing the security of the unit, major plumbing leaks, flooding, gas or fuel oil leaks, electrical conditions that could result in shock or fire, moving to the top of 14, no heating system, Utility is not in service. So there is an inclusive list here as far as whether something else that's not here fell under a serious health safety violation. I assume that's going to be a determination of the Division of Fire Safety at that point, to what level of seriousness is the violation afforded to their groups.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Barbara, Tom, and Ken. So page 13, I'm wondering how much it gets into what their reasonable attempt is. Basically,

[Rep. Karen Dolan (Member)]: if the issues

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: are not correct, if it's sort of a pretty weak effort that a landlord made, landlord might think that's reasonable.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Yes, ma'am. It's not defined. So ultimately, a court would make that determination of what would be reasonable. My understanding is for Division of Fire Safety, at least according to that statute, they should be providing landlords with a specific time frame of fixing those citations. So if they were supposed to be fixed within a specific time period, and it's thirty days after that later, landlord may want to make a case that that's not reasonable. But it is defined terms.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Tom, Ken, and Karen. I didn't wanna leave y'all. I'm

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: wondering if you process the landlord being issued a citation for something if the tenant also notified in the process.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I'd wanna go check two six seven seven. I do not remember. I have I have to look.

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: I just kidding. Thanks. So let's just go back to something that happens all the time. As simple as trash. The tenants just load up a trash, they won't take the trash out, the next thing you know, you got rodents, you got everything in there, right? You've got the safety feature, I assume that was following the safety feature of the, if you have more than one unit in there, right? That becomes more of an issue with that. You can't get in, it smells, it does everything, and it happens, I know what happens, We have experience, and you can't get in there. Then I'm hearing the court system. The court system could take thirty days, could take god knows how long. Right? You're putting more and more in jeopardy of your other tenants. Where's the fallback on that? Because we the the the process hasn't been hasn't been speeded up at all from from what I'm reading and hearing? How are we dealing with that?

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: So I will say, going back to the access fees, the landlord can gain access to the dwelling unit if there is a threat of imminent danger to a person or the premises. So Once in five days? Nope. That could go in at any point. The landlord could you were saying if there's trash building up and it's smelling and there's potential for rodent activity, etcetera, I'm saying that the landlord could access the dwelling unit at any point if there is an imminent threat of danger to the person or the premises. So I'm saying the landlord may be able to go in immediately and try to address the issue that's going on in the unit. But then if you're talking about the time frames here, I would say that the time frame for termination in most instances that are what I call the just cause instances. So similar to what you're outlining here, if somebody is not complying with the terms of the agreement, you have to maintain a clean premises, or you're destroying the property because you're leaving trash everywhere, etcetera. Then the time frame is shortened to twenty one days under this proposal. I'm just trying to get there. So that would be under B1. It's currently thirty days. And this proposal would reduce it to twenty one days, unless you as the landlord are going to argue that the termination is based on damage to the dwelling unit here, in which case it would be shortened to five days. However, as soon as that happens, if somebody is living with a trash thing, and

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: what's the other big thing that's happening now where they're just a cluster of mess in there and all that, forty and all that. That'll fall into more health, health reasons, maybe mental health. I, I don't know how they'll do it. It'll go, the tenant will go and file more because a lot of them know how to do this, they will file more into the court system, and it's gonna tie it up more and the landlord's hands are tied, they can't do anything, putting the other tenants in more risk. So I'm still not seeing how we're we're we're getting we're we're fixing a problem of safety for other tenants, and also the owner of the building that's probably got payments to make on it, has been a mortgage and taxes and all that. So I

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: think he's getting to that part of the objection component in an expedited way. I think that should hopefully answer some of

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: your issues, Kent. I would say for at least the proposal here, if it's for nonpayment or for some sort of breach of the rental agreement terms, the termination periods are being shortened as far as whether somebody could, as you mentioned, go to court or tie things up that would delay that action. I'm not a practitioner on the ground in this case, so I would defer that question to some others who may be better able to answer how these things actually play out practically on the ground. Thank you. The last thing I'll comment here on this affirmative defense is this sub two on page 14, which is the remedies for the tenant in that instance are not available if the serious health and safety code violation is caused by the tenant's negligent or deliberate act or admission. So the tenant can't cause the violation and then subsequently take advantage of

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: the defense after that. Okay.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Now we're going get to the ejectment provisions, which is where our input series three stars.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: But this is an important background. Rest of your seat. This year. Background

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: the section. So beginning here on page 15, this is adding a section into 12 BSA six sixty three, which authorize alternate service of process throughout a proceeding if it's been issued by a court. So this isn't necessarily going to be limited to an ejectment case. So what this section is saying is, if the court orders that alternate service of process be made in a civil proceeding this is here on line eight the order shall remain in effect and apply to all subsequent service of process in the same proceeding, including post judgment proceedings. The section shall apply to orders issued pursuant to the modern rules of civil procedure four(one), permitting service of process by publication or by leaving a copy of the defendant's dwelling house or usual abode. So just that. If you go in and you file a motion and you're seeking some sort of alternate service of process, then subsequently, that's going to apply to all of the notice requirements to the remainder of the proceeding and not for whatever that instance of notice or service that you're seeking. Then when we get into the next piece here, which is chapter 169 related to objectment specifically, there's a change here in service of process to say, unless otherwise provided by law, the process shall be served in notice given as in all other civil actions. So if you're making the change above regarding the alternate services process throughout, this is simply making a corresponding change in the ejectment section to say, unless otherwise authorized. So those two sections just go hand in hand. So before I move forward, I'm going to just comment that, as you can see here on line one, there is currently a process in Title XII regarding ejectment for the circumstances we've been describing. When a tenant remains after the date of termination that's been provided in the notice, the landlord can go into court and pursue an ejectment action. So this statutory construct currently exists. Within that, there are two sections to be aware of. One of them is this piece right here, 4,853. The landlord, at the time they're bringing the complaint or separately after the complaint's filed, the landlord can ask that rent be paid into court during the process of the ejectment case. And so the first change here is simply fixing a statutory issue where there are currently two subsection As. They were amended in the same year way back in 2007. They currently both still exist. And so my recommendation to the House General Committee was to clean that up. And so they obstruct the first instance because the second instance is a little bit more descriptive. So as I mentioned in the sub A here, in any action against the tenant for possession, the landlord can file the motion to have rent paid into court. Thank you. What this change does on page 17 is the court can order either full payment of rents. So if the monthly rent is $1,000 the court can say, you need to pay $1,000 on this day into court. Or the court can issue partial payment of rent. So it's not obligated that the court order the full payment. The proposal from the House General Committee was to remove the authorization of partial payment. So the court could only order full payment at that point in time. And so that's what those two amendments there are, just striking the word partial from D. And then the subsection G is the tenant may, at any time, apply to reduce the amount ordered. And so it would remove the authority of the tenant to seek that. So the court can now, with this language, only order full payment? Yes, it is.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: And would that stop a landlord and tenant from making a deal as far as payments go?

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Not to my knowledge based on anything in the statutory language, but I would defer that question to the judiciary or to others who are practicing in this area of whether they feel that this change would somehow limit their ability to seek a settlement during some sort of agreement for an alternate an alternate amount for a different

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Sensible payment, I didn't pick up. Is there a timeline on where that would be?

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: What's not in this section and so I'm pulling this out there is, in the sub B, it says that a hearing on the motion so the motion for What page are we on now? Here, I'll pull up the statutory section so we can review it, because it's not in the bill, because it's not being amended. So this is that section in the Superior Court of Jackman subcapture 4853A. So the motion is filed. And the sub B, it just says that the hearing has to be held at any time after fourteen days notice to the parties. If the tenant appears at the hearing and has not previously defaulted, the court shall not enter judgment by default unless the tenant fails to file a written answer within fourteen days after the hearing. Any rent or escrow order shall remain in effect notwithstanding the issuance of a default judgment, but shall cease upon the execution upon the conclusion of the case. And so if there is opposition, a memorandum of opposition filed, it has to include an affidavit setting forth particular facts of why. If the court finds the tenant is obligated to fail rent and fails to do so, the court shall order full or partial payment into court of rent as it accrues. So conceivably, the tenant is still living in the dwelling unit. They're still obligated to pay rent while you're bringing the ejectment action. And so D is saying that if the court finds that the tenant is obligated to pay and they're not doing so, that's where you shall order full or partial payment gives the option. And the proposed amendment is taking away the option of the partial. So the court in that instance, you're being ejected. You're still there. You're obligated to pay rent while you're living there. We're going to order that you pay the full amount into court. So

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: I think No, I have no,

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I had some similar questions, and I'm going to ask questions of not necessarily you, but other witnesses flag it for me right now, there are rent escrow days at the court where they have landlords and tenants coming in in these situations, and often they get agreement between the tenant and the landlord of paying partial. And this would take that discretion away. I think that it takes the inability for the parties to agree to something and for the court to enter it. So I flag this as concern, and we'll have to

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: further get this to speak. My next question was going to be, maybe for somebody else, why that was changed.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I the I won't speak for the committee. The conversation was concern about the landlord as their own obligations, and the rent was agreed upon of a certain amount. And that was some of the discussion. And I'll leave it at that. You're raising good questions. And there is also later on in this new subchapter a period about where the tenant or defendant has a specific time frame to cure a complaint brought due to failure to pay rent, and they have to cure that within a very specific time frame, or they lose the right to cure as a matter of law, as how the language is written, I would raise the same question that you have maybe to the judiciary and to the advocates as whether that would prohibit some sort of ongoing negotiation of the parties during the process that the ejecting is playing out. If this isn't ours,

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: I mean, if they had their discussions over there about it, and I would be inclined to leave it alone and to not change something they did if it isn't ours. If it is ours, I think when it comes to court discretion and taking away court discretion, that definitely is a not Okay. I think it's at least where it's conversation. Yeah.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I mean, this is a valid civil court process. So I think it I'm not here to advise you what your jurisdiction is, but I think it probably falls within your jurisdiction. Okay, so moving to this next section. This is about property of the tenant remaining on the premises after eviction. There is a separate section before this I think it's before this, but it says that if the landlord is issued the writ of possession, so they get the judgment and the ejectment action, that has to be served by the sheriff. And then the language says this isn't in this amendment. But in the statute, the language says that not earlier than fourteen days after the sheriff serves the judgment on the tenant or the defendant to remove the individual from the property. So arguably, there is a statutory fourteen day minimum period where after the judgment is issued and served to the individual, the individual would have that fourteen day period to vacate and remove their belongings before the sheriff would come back and then change the locks or remove the individual. This section says that the landlord can dispose of property remaining without any liability fifteen days after the writ of possession is served or upon legally being restored to possession of the dwelling unit. So the discussion was judgments issued served to the defendant, potentially a fourteen day period of waiting before the sheriff comes back and removes the individual. And then at that point, the landlord would have to maintain the property for another fifteen days after that, because this section says it's fifteen days after it's served or after the landlord being legally restored to possession, whichever is later. And so that time period could be ultimately twenty one days if the entire period is carried out. And the committee felt that that was too long. They felt that after this entire termination period and the judgment process has played out, the judgment is served to the defendant. They're given at least another fourteen days that at that point, when the landlord is restored to possession of the premises, the landlord should be able to dispose of that property at that point. So that's what this section is doing. So where's the fourteen days in your

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: liability in here? Is Two days.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: What would stop? It's in 4854. So court finds the plaintiff is entitled to possession. Plaintiff has the judgment for possession and rents due damages, etcetera. Writ of possession shall issue on the date the judgment is entered. Writ shall direct the sheriff to serve the writ upon the defendant and not earlier than fourteen days put the plaintiff into possession.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay, so not earlier. It could be filed in the court. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. This fifteen days is added on to it under current law. There's Okay. And

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I will say I was not in the room, but I was informed by the committee that there was some discussion from they had certain sheriffs or law enforcement officers come testify about these provisions as they go hand in hand about delivering a service and when can the landlord remove the property. And there appeared to be some confusion or disagreement about the timelines. Some individuals I was not there. But I was informed that some individuals testified that the language is, even though it says fifteen days, they were interpreting it to be fifteen days after the writ of possession is served, which means when the landlord is restored to possession after those fourteen days that you wait a day, and that's fifteen. I read the statute differently because it says it's fifteen days after the writ is served or upon the landlord being legally restored, whichever is later. Presumably, the landlord is going to be legally restored later in most cases. I understand the circumstance, but maybe not. But I'm just highlighting for you all that some individuals read this section different than I'm reading. But I think the language is pretty plain and clear.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: That there is a 14. And then

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: this would require an additional 15. And I would say that this is really

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: this is host Genovich's decision on that, because it doesn't really involve quite a bit problems. We have problems with it, but again Okay. Can I

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: just ask you a question about that? Yeah, yeah.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: So as you know, I'm not

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: a lawyer, but this whole document judicial. This whole thing?

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yeah, but there are parts that the other committee has jurisdiction overlap some, but there are certain decisions that they are making after weeks of testimony that don't have anything to do with directly with the court process. And this immediately, this language right here that we just looked at, it's not directly related to the court process. It's not impacting timing of the court. It's not impacting discretion of the court or any of those things. So I know it's sometimes not a clear line, but I think with respect to that, that's not Individually we can weigh in on this, but just as a committee, not really our jurisdiction. Just that section that we just looked at, the property of tenant remaining on premises at the eviction.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: I'm sure I a goal with bringing this up. Service of the writ of possession, you're waiting fifteen days before they remove the tax. Fourteen. Fourteen days. Sorry.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Yes,

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: sir. And then fifteen days to return the prop or take the property out.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: You you would have to hold that property for an additional fifteen days before you could dispose of it under current law. And this proposal is to change it to immediately. So this, here we go on page bottom of page 18. What this is doing is it is creating a new subchapter in the ejectment chapter. So as I mentioned a bit ago, subchapter three, there already is a process for bringing the ejectment case. This is creating a new subchapter. So it's going to create an alternate ejectment, the capacity of a landlord to bring a case in a different subchapter than the one that already exists. But you could have potentially two separate types of ejectment cases going. This, the sub 4,861 here, is saying that this is limited under nine VSA four thousand four and sixty seven A and B. So that's why I wanted to talk about A and B earlier. Because what this is saying is this ejectment process is only for terminations due to nonpayment of rent or for breach of a material term of a rental agreement, for breach obligations, activity that threatens other individuals, etcetera. So we're only talking about terminations in those two instances. The sub 4,862 on page 19, it really just mirrors a lot of the current language that's in statute for current objectments. The process issues as a summons, requires the defendant to appear and answer, and shall include a copy of the rental agreement, if any, and the notice to terminate. And then it also mirrors the previous subchapter about either party having a right to a trial by jury. 04/1963 is the answer period. Here's where it starts to change from what currently exists. This section would require that the defendant file an answer within fourteen days after service from the complaint. And that is different from the current process, which would follow the rules of civil procedure, generally require twenty one days. So this is the first instance where it's altering what currently exists both in an objectment action but under your rules of civil procedure globally. The answer to the complaint has to be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the facts. Okay, this next C1, this is what I mentioned earlier about that cure period. So this says that if the complaint is due to failure to pay rent it's on line 20 the defendant may cure the action by paying all rents owed, board costs, and service fees by the answer date. So the individual would have fourteen days after the complaint is filed to pay all of those monies. If payment is not received by the answer date, moving to the top of page 20, the defendant shall lose the right to cure the complaint as a matter of law. A plaintiff may accept payment in whole report and dismiss the complaint. The defendant shall not have the right to cure in subsequent action. And this was my point, was you may want to ask the judiciary and other external parties of whether they feel this may restrict their ability to have ongoing settlement during the case. This is in the sub two here. Upon receipt of the answer, if the termination is based on A or B1, the court shall set a hearing date not later than sixty days after the date of the service of complaint absent good cause. My understanding is that's a pretty significant difference to the current authority of the court when it comes to when to set And hearings?

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: What's that language there? I want to

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: make sure I thought it was not It's

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: on line seven, page 20. There is no similar time frame general time frame built into the current ejectment chapter. There is an expedited process for specific circumstances in the current ejectment chapter. But this is saying that any complaint brought under 04/1967 or has to be decided within sixty days. Then you get to a section around defaults. The defendant fails to provide the answer. The plaintiff shall be entitled to possession. Can you back up just for one moment? Wanna make So I'm

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: this process, I'm just trying to go back to the reasons for the termination. So you have back on page seven and eight, you have subdivision

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: B1 and B two. So this whole process applies to both? The new subchapter would apply to A and B, both B one and two. This new subchapter would apply to all of those. This language here, though, that says that the final hearing has to be within sixty days is only for A or B1, not for a termination brought under B2, which is the termination that is threatening the health or safety of the other individuals, the landlord, neighbors, etcetera. So B2 is covered by then B2 is gonna come up here in a second related to this show pause here. Okay, thank you. Yes, sir. But it's Thank you for pointing that out because I needed to point it out to you.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Some type of branch, establishing type of branch for the failure to pay rent, for instance, in some other types.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Failure to pay rent or failure to comply with the material terms of the agreement, repeated late payment of rent, not allowing the landlord access. Those reasons, they're going to be required to have a final hearing in sixty days. Now, if you get to the circumstance where it's a termination because of the threatening activity, So the language specifically is make sure I get it right termination based on acts of violence, damage to the dwelling unit, or other activity which threatens the health or safety of other residents, the landlord, or the neighbors, if it's one of those reasons, you have this section called show cause hearing. So when it says that if the complaint is based termination for one of those reasons, the court shall set a show cause hearing within ten days after an answer is filed. If the defendant fails to appear, plaintiff is awarded possession. Sub B, moving to the top of page 21, at the show cause hearing, defendant shall provide a rebuttal to the facts supporting the termination claims brought. Sub C, parties may rely on affidavit evidence during a show cause hearing made under the pains of penalties of perjury. If the defendant makes a showing that live testimony is required or upon the court's own determination, a final hearing may be ordered. In the event a final hearing is ordered, the final hearing shall be set within twenty one days after the date of the show cause hearing. So if you're terminating and you're bringing an object when action because of one of those reasons that threaten health or safety of other people, other tenants, the landlord, or the neighbors, first, you have a show cause hearing within ten days after the answer. So remember, the other sub said sixty days after the answer. You have to have the final hearing. This is saying ten days after. And then that can be based on affidavit evidence if you need a final hearing twenty one days after that. So it would be arguably thirty one days total, or at least the final hearing would have to be thirty one days after the answer for terminations under DAT V2. So what are the standards for what has to

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: be in a complaint to lead to a so called hearing? Is that laid out anywhere?

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: If you recall, at least in the termination notice itself, it has to include an affidavit setting forth particular facts and the basis thereof in support of the termination with sufficient details to inform the tenant of the reasoning behind the termination. So that would have to be included. Outside of that, the complaint itself would need to comply with the requirements of your rules of civil procedure regarding what needs to be in the complaint.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So the affidavit has to

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: be included with the complaint? I believe so. The initial affidavit has to be included with the termination notice provided to the tenant.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Right. But then does Zach get forwarded to the and then one second.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Just wanting to get to the beginning of this section. And then when you get up to four eight six two at the beginning of this new subchapter, that notice to terminate has to be attached to the complaint. So the information that was provided as part of a termination has to be included as part of the complaint.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Okay.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Next section here, costs and judgment really mirrors what exists in the current subchapter. If the court is finding for the plaintiff issuing the writ of possession, having the sheriff serve the writ not earlier than fourteen days put the plaintiff into possession. So same time frames there after the judgment's issued. And then 4867, the property mirrors the change above about the landlord being able to dispose of property immediately. And we get to page 22, where we're going to start talking about trespass. So that's the new subchapter related to terminations of these two. Just before we go on to the trespass. Okay, so

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: we've got these two processes. One is for the subdivision A, one is for the B. The A one, you have a right to a jury trial. The B one, you're going through this kind of show cause hearing and maybe a final hearing. If the show cause hearing is like an in person hearing that the parties can proceed by affidavit on, and then the final hearing could also be an in person hearing, but there needs to be a showing either by a party or some discretion that they need another hearing. Then that one would also be an in person hearing where they need live testimony.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: So a few

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yeah, I'm trying to just make sure I understand.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: A few things to alter there. This new subchapter would govern the quote unquote just cause termination reasons. Yes. So if you're terminating because of A or B. Yep. If it's A, nonpayment of rent, or B1

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Sorry, yeah, it was A or B1.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yes, sir. Then you

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: don't need the show cause hearing. You just have to have the final hearing within sixty days.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: And that final hearing could be

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: a jury trial? Individual could have a right to a jury trial for any the term and any ejectment that's brought.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Okay, any rules, that is Any

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: of the reasons. Above. And either party could ask for.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Yep. Okay.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: And so for the A or the B1, any final hearing has to be within sixty days. If it's for the b two because of some sort of acts that threaten the health and safety of other people, then you're going to have this show cause hearing in a much shorter time period.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: At

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: the show cause hearing, both parties could provide affidavit evidence under penalty of perjury. I would defer to the judiciary on how they would go about doing that. And then if there is a need for live testimony so some of the discussion and the testimony in the House General Committee was, how are you proving that these individuals are threatening or violent against their other tenants? The other tenants may be dissuaded or concerned about testifying against someone in this hearing if they're worried about that individual being violent against them. This is the discussion. I'm not saying this is you can imagine this being the case. And so they may not want to go into court and testify. So that was from some of the advocates, that was the concept of doing the show pause, was you have the initial hearing. You can use affidavit evidence. If live testimony was required because the court was not comfortable, there's conflicting testimony in the affidavits, then they can request that live hearing. And if they do so, it has to then be within twenty one days after this one.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Great. Okay. I appreciate the summarizing of it. It's very helpful. Okay.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Page 22, this new section says, after being legally restored to possession of the dwelling unit or leased premise pursuant to the chapter, the plaintiff may issue to the defendant an order against trespass for the entire premise subject to the objectionable action in accordance with 13 PSA 3,705, which is where you have the language regarding trespass orders. So then this next section here related to trespass is really incorporating a bill that is in this committee, age seven twenty eight. I believe one of the members at the table can speak intimately to this. But so it has a purpose statement, the purpose being to overrule the Supreme Court's decision here in State v. Dixon back in 1999. And this would then, in section five, amend the unlawful trespass section. So in sub A, a person can issue a no trespass order. Has to be the person in lawful possession has to issue that order. And then this new G1 is saying notwithstanding that sub A, the landlord can issue an order against trespass if, in page 23, one of the following conditions are met. The tenant agrees or consents to the order. The invitee or licensee subject to the order is violating terms of the dwelling unit's lease agreement, or the invitee or licensee has violated the state of federal law while on the premises. And then it has a specific appeal period, and then it references the definition of dwelling unit intended to the residential rental agreement chapter. So it's expanding trespass to authorize the landlord to issue the order of trespass against somebody who's on the property, either conducting illegal activity, violating the dwelling unit's lease terms, or if the tenant requests the landlord to keep safe. Okay, and then we get into the next few sections here are about ejectment records and the confidential nature of those records. So this would be adding a new subchapter five under the ejectment chapter. So if you recall, in the ejectment chapter I mentioned, you have the current subchapter three, which is about current ejectments. New subchapter for these expedited ejectments for certain termination reasons. This adds another subchapter about confidentiality of those records. I'm not going to read this word for words. I know you have a lot of other witnesses. 4872, all newly filed ejectment complaints would be confidential upon filing, and they would remain confidential unless the confidentiality is removed based on 4873. The new section 4,873 states that if the court of jurisdiction issues a final or a default judgment in favor of the landlord due to termination based on that A or B. So only terminations based on nonpayment of rent, breach of the rental terms, or threatening activity. If the landlord gets the judgment at the end of the case based on one of those terminations, then it would be unsealed. Or I shouldn't use the word unsealed. It would lose its confidential status at that point. And then there's a section stating the next section is, if it's confidential, the person may answer that there wasn't a prior objectment. And it states that consumer reporting agencies have to comply with the confidential nature in reporting any information as part of a tenant screening report. A tenant who is injured based on a consumer reporting agency reporting information that would be confidential would be able to bring an action for injunctive relief or damages. The section 4,875 states that the parties to the case, the judge, the court staff, or the attorneys representing individuals can access those confidential records. And then the court can make the records that are confidential available to any person with a valid fourth order. Is it. The remainder of the bill is about a credit reporting pilot program and positions, appropriations, etcetera.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Appreciate it. Thanks for the great walkthrough. Yeah, go ahead, Barbara, ask questions.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: I think I just was losing it at the end. So if is if the records are confidential and I'm a landlord and I wanna rent to Ken, and Ken just had a confidential eviction, are you saying that if I call Tom, who needs to rent to Ken, Tom is gonna say Ken didn't have an

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: eviction? The section is limited to the records that the court has, so I don't see anything that would prohibit if you're doing some sort of reference check from an individual How

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: would say, I took him to court and evicted him?

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: So confidential means is the definition. Confidential means to limit access only to those persons who are authorized by law or court to view the record. But then when you get down to ejectment record is a recorded information pertaining to an ejectment case that is in possession, custody, or control of a court or was in the possession of a court. So I'm not aware of anything that would prohibit an individual who is aware that the ejectment was brought or that someone was ejected from reporting that information. Perfect. So it's just the court papers. And,

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: for example, could not put Tom down as a reference. He might not get the apartment because he doesn't have a formal language reference.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Way I read the language as it came out of the committee or as proposed, in the incident that you're describing, the case remained confidential, you would not have to disclose that you were rejected. But if you provided a reference or the individual knew that you used to rent from someone and contacted that individual and that person said, I had to eject that individual, I believe there's anything in here that's going to prohibit that from happening or there would be a consequence for that action.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: I'm relating it to employment. When I used to, you know, when I had a number of employees, and sometimes you have to get rid of somebody, and they go apply someplace else, and I would never tell anybody I'd hire anybody. I would just tell them that I wouldn't rehire I

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: don't have to go too deep on that, but what Barbara was just saying about the Ken and the Sean thing, right? Like, would never go and say I evicted somebody or something like that, because I just want them out of there and out of my life, and then throw that person on somebody else, which happens all the time. Yeah. Like a suit. And then, yes, do.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Alright. So we're gonna

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: have to change. I'm afraid we're not gonna be able to get through all these witnesses today because I'm gonna be losing forum at 03:00. And I do wanna hear from judge Zonay, but we'll reschedule other folks. I really apologize, but I assume that you probably wanted to hear what this was all, the testimony was anyway. But I do want to just jump to Judge Zone and Carrie Karnesotans, she's been waiting. So thank you very much, Cameron. Thank you very much.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I'm going to remain with you.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: No. No. That's great. Counseling too. The chair awaits. Over to

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: from judge Zoning. You get your own chair.

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: Good afternoon. Tom Zoning, chief superior judge. I did hear the chair at the beginning and I will focus on the areas that have to do with the judiciary and the impact on the courts that fit within this committee's jurisdiction. On page eight, line 14, it talks about the actual notice being accompanied by an affidavit setting forth particular facts and the basis therefore. This is an affidavit that has to be served upon the defendant, the tenant with the actual notice of termination. It's unclear what particular facts and the basis therefore means. Does it mean you were selling drugs? Does it mean you were selling drugs on this date? Does it mean you're selling drugs on this date to that person? In other words, I think that there's going to be some questions about whether or not whatever is being filed is sufficient, and what we can identify from that. Is hearsay, secondhand hearsay, is that going to be a particular fact in the basis? So I just put that out there as something that may be an issue. Subsection

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: B Can

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I ask a question on that real quick? Unless you have more on that one subsection. No, so is this because that notice is not just for termination, but that's a notice that, or the affidavit I should say, could be arriving at court as part of the complaint, and that's where it starts becoming a little bit more of a problem.

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: Well, to that, but I'm not sure that I would necessarily agree that it has to be filed with the complaint. I think that's actually an open question, because the complaint, if you go back, and I don't have the number in front of me, the complaint says that you have to, the new statute says that the complaint has to attach a copy of the notice of termination. If you look here on page eight, the affidavit accompanies the notice, actual notice of termination. So a reading of that may well be that an affidavit is not part of the notice of termination because it accompanies it and is something separate and distinct. If that were the interpretation, then the later section that says what has to be filed with the complaint would need to include also the affidavit that was filed, and if that occurred, the answer to your question is yes.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: With all that, we still need to clarify. We've got that, Cameron. Yes. Alright. Karen has a type of one.

[Rep. Karen Dolan (Member)]: So yeah. So to your original point about that particular fax is kind of vague. I'm guessing that's because before it was specific to there's either criminal activity or as legal drug activity that was very specific, and now we've opened it up. Is that what we're looking for to be able to give more understanding of why this Under activity

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: rules of civil procedure, we have what's called notice pleadings, you have to put the party generally on notice of the acts that you are relying upon in seeking relief. What seeks to do is to focus more and let the defendant, the tenant know these are the specific facts, and if there's going to be a termination of tenancy for illegal activity or whatever it may be, these are the facts that we're relying upon so that they have knowledge of what they are. And I suspect the reason that's put in is because of the other procedures, whether it's the show cause and other matters that have been added, because this sets in motion a course of events that currently does not exist under Vermont law because there are significant changes to the process for landlord tenant with the new bill.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So it would seem under, this is under subdivision B2B, and it would seem that the particular facts would be implicitly related to 2A, the acts of violence, the damage, the threats, the health and safety and the like. But you're thinking that that needs to be spelled out a little more clearly?

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: I'm also thinking that when we talk about particular facts, it's important for the committee to understand that that's not a bright line. Oftentimes in litigation, you there will be filings to say we need more particularized facts from the other party because we don't understand what it is. And so if a landlord were to file something saying, they sold drugs, period, Would everyone in the committee agree that that's a particular fact? Well, on one level it is, others may say, well, that's not particular for here. So I'm just pointing out that I think that this will need further It will be addressed in courts in a way that is not as clean and direct as some may hope.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So we might not be able to fix it in legislation, in other words. This could be a case by case.

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: I could foresee circumstances where the defense argues that the facts weren't particular, therefore you never conformed your notice of termination to what was required, and you have to go back to chutes and ladders. You go all the way back to the beginning. That would be a potential argument courts will have to wade through.

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: Right. Okay.

[Rep. Karen Dolan (Member)]: So And if that happens, that's multiple court proceedings going back and forth. So getting

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: Potentially, or multiple filings at least.

[Rep. Karen Dolan (Member)]: Gaining the fact of us trying to

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Okay. That's helpful. Okay.

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: The second section that was on line 18, a landlord shall not terminate. This is the section on medical assistance, and I understand the intent here. Title 18 very clearly identifies that it's section four thousand two fifty four, reporting a drug overdose, immunity from liability, and what it talks about is a person who in good faith and in a timely manner seeks medical assistance for someone who has experienced a drug overdose shall not be cited, arrested or prosecuted for a violation of this chapter. And then it also goes on to talk about some alcohol chapters. Subsequently, it talks about that the same provision, the same lead in, it says the person cannot be subject to violations of 13 BSA ten thirty for violation of a protection order, and the reason I point that out is because if you look at the language here, it says on page nine, line one, and evidence obtained from the good faith request for medical assistance for a drug overdose shall not be used in an ejectment action. That is broader than the Title 18 type immunity. Title 18, as I just noted, says that you can't use it in a Title 18 chapter case and certain title 13. This said that the landlord can't use anything in the ejectment action. What that would mean is that even if the landlord came in and found evidence of, let's say, human trafficking when this occurred, he could not use it under the way this is if that's how if they found out because of this. And so I think that there may be some consequences with that broadening that may not be intended, but again, that's a statutory question. Title, page 15. This is the section on alternative service or process. I would first note that this is for, as counsel pointed out, as alleged counsel mentioned, this is for all cases, all civil. This isn't just landlord tenant. And this is, we've talked about this in your committee earlier this year about TAC orders and the due process, the constitutional protections, due diligence, showing reasons why. The entire structure of those types of orders is routed in due process, and the courts can assess the specific facts to determine whether due process is met and whether it's necessary. There may be reasons to have it at the beginning of a case, and yet the defendant arrives and there's no reason to have it after that. In other words, it is dependent on the facts at the time of the service. I'm unaware of any situations where courts have been unable to decide motions for alternative service in a way that addresses the specific facts with regard for due process, and I would note that it talks about on line 18 that the court has to decide these motions in three days. Leaving aside three days, it's important, as I've said a number of times, that to keep when we have these types of statutes to try to put in deadlines for judges to reach decisions, addressing motions and issuing decisions is a core central component of the judicial function. Determining what matters are properly submitted is everything here that we need to rule on. The order in which the judge is going to look at cases and address them and the time required for the judge to carefully deliberate these motions and orders are traditionally recognized as matters within the core judicial management. This gives rise to questions that I suggest we don't need to go into with adding deadlines for timing, for judges to act. Judges will act and do act promptly and prioritizing matters as we need to. Are there times where parties may say, well, I filed this case, yes, and something may have taken longer than any of us would like, that can happen. But I would suggest that overall we understand the prioritization of these types of cases and these types of motions, and that first of all, again, don't need to add statutes that say the judge essentially if you do it once for alternative service, it's forever because I think that gives rise to additional questions. And then as far as the timing, three days, what happens if the court doesn't? Does that mean it's denied? Does that mean it's granted? I would, again, just say that adding timelines for judges to make decisions is not a road that should be gone down.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: And I think as you know, in this committee that we generally follow what you're saying, but we have been allowed or allowed, you have not objected to us using the word promptly. That should go without saying, maybe we should go through all statutes to get rid of all promptly using all those things some other time, because pretty much we're getting to the point where we're always telling you to rule promptly. Maybe we can find some cases that we can say take your time. Let's get the backlog. We'll be a little more concise. We'll just say no hurry for some of these other ones. But I think promptly, would that be objectionable?

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: I don't have a problem with promptly, but as you point out, we try and that's certainly our goal. But if that is something that works for the legislature, we understand that message.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So let me back up to A. So as I'm understanding, it's the first sentence and actually possibly the whole provision that's not necessary. Because four d one has to be used in the way and I think that without that first sentence and that's if we Yeah, it doesn't make sense that you've established that you can do tack orders at one point of time that you have to do it the rest of the time. That's what I'm hearing.

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: That's correct. Mean, I can give you the example. If you do a TAC order and then you learn the person was in the hospital and now they're not in the hospital anymore, and they're living somewhere else, does the legislature really think that we should continue to do TAC orders that were issued initially or that we should say, no, now you know where they are, go serve them.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: They're just engaged now.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Okay. All right. Page

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: 17. The top section, this is the the committee was questioning before. It removed the word partial. This limits discretion to the court. If we're doing a rent escrow hearing and there's claims about habitability, the court, let's say the rent agreed to is a thousand dollars, but the court hears evidence that something is not right and the court thinks, well, it should only be 800 based upon what's missing on habitability at least now. This removes that type of discretion from the court to enter an order that would provide the landlord with a just sum of money based upon the court's findings. And while, again, typically my understanding is that it is in full, there are limited times where partial may be necessary in the court's view based upon the evidence. And so limiting the discretion here, that's a legislative decision, but I'm not sure it's necessary. Page 19.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Line

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: 15. This, alleged counsel noticed, this fourteen days is not usual. Civil claims are 21. I would suggest that where all of our other dockets are twenty one days, this may very well sow some type of confusion. People who may have had other litigation are going to look and not see the fourteen days because right now, if you go on the judiciary website, our forms for civil cases says twenty one days. And so now we put another form up there that says fourteen days, and a litigant goes up, looks at the wrong form, and then we're getting motions saying I I got the wrong form, I read the wrong form, or I didn't read the summons close enough. I just don't it's up to the legislature if that seven days is worth the potential for having a carve out. On line 17, it says an answer to the complaint filed must be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth particular facts. Back to my point about particular facts, if the complaint says that you dealt drugs and you dealt it on this date, and is it a particular fact to say no, I did not, period. If they weren't even in the state, and they say that, is that sufficient? So it also we don't have cases generally where you file an affidavit in response. There is a verified complaint in foreclosure that is required, but I just point out here again that this question of particular facts in the answer, it's new, it's different, and what if they don't file particular facts? Is that a default? Does that entitle the plaintiff to judgment? So that's not clearly spelled out what happens if they don't file that. Do we give them additional time to file it? Page Oh

[Rep. Karen Dolan (Member)]: yeah, a question here. So I'm hearing the fax piece is new. Did you did I also hear you say the affidavit part is new too? Correct.

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: Yes.

[Rep. Karen Dolan (Member)]: And and some but he can't just create an affidavit on their own, can they? How do they do that?

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Do it.

[Rep. Karen Dolan (Member)]: So it's a process. Okay. That's a whole another thing too. Line

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: 19 on page 19 talks about the curing situation. Currently, it can cure up until the time the writ of possession is issued. This tightens that cure period up to the answer date, which is under this bill fourteen days, And what it says is if you don't pay within that fourteen days to cure, that you the defendant tenant loses the right to cure as a matter of law. My understanding is that we often see the tenants able to work with organizations and others to get money to cure, and so that's a policy decision if the legislature wants to tighten it up and remove that possibility after that, whatever the answer period would be. Line on page 20, line seven, this is the court shall set a hearing I'm sorry.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I apologize. Let me go back to that. So is this a situation where the court is in the mix on this or is that really between

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: the parties? That's between the parties.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Right. Okay.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: All right, that's, yeah, that's, all right, thanks.

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: Page 20, line seven. If there's an answer, the court shall set a final hearing not later than sixty days after the service of the complaint, absent good cause shown. This doesn't take into account anything that may have intervened, which I assume would be considered good cause shown, but also keep in mind, there's a right to a jury trial. This would effectively, and this committee is well aware of the 70 five-fifty 9 A sixty day hold without bail cases that we have to have immediate jury trials on. And so this language essentially is putting this section, these cases on par with that, telling the courts, we want these cases within sixty days. So if they demand a jury trial, that's the goal. And the court would have to, of course, assess whether there's good cause to not meet it. But I suggest that having that in there, knowing right away that it's something that's probably never gonna be met for a jury trial within sixty days on of the date of the complaint, It might be setting up expectations that are not going to be realized. On page 20, lines eight through 14 talk about default. There currently is a rule of civil procedure, rule 55, which clearly sets forth what the requirements are for a default judgment. This sets forth different requirements and does not incorporate all of the rule 55 requirements. It says that they would the plaintiff shall provide shall file a motion for possession based on the default and shall include an affidavit that provides proof of service. The court shall decide on the motion within five days after the filing. Again, the five days, you know my position on that. But this doesn't talk about affidavits of military service and majority. It doesn't talk about whether the person is competent under rule 55 standards. Rule 55 says that you have to have facts to establish liability, included in the filing. This actually suggests that the landlord could not follow the law and not be entitled to judgment based upon the pleadings, but because the tenant defendant does not respond, that the court is still obligated to decide the motion to possibly render judgment in favor of the landlord. And so rule 55 works for a structure to address default, and I'm not sure that trying to come up with different types of structures for that is necessary to effectuate what it looks like the policy going forward on. Just below that is the show cause hearing. I guess the easiest way to say this is I guess I'm somewhat confused about what this really does because the court has to first set a show cause hearing within ten days after an answer is filed. If the defendant fails to appear, the plaintiff shall be awarded possession of the premises. Let's assume they appear. The defendant shall provide a rebuttal to the facts supporting the termination claims bought by the plaintiff. I don't know what a rebuttal is to the claims. It's standing up and saying, nope, I didn't do it, a rebuttal. It says the parties can rely on an affidavit evidence, so now we know there's an affidavit. It doesn't say the party can rely on hearsay, but that's another issue the courts would have to address. So they rely on evidence in an affidavit, and if the defendant makes a showing that live testimony is required or upon the court's own determination, a final hearing may be ordered. Conspicuously absent is what kind of ruling the court can make in the case after it hears from both sides. It looks like the only ruling the court can make if someone appears is that live testimony is required and we have to have a trial. It doesn't provide the court a mechanism to grant judgment if the court thinks the tenant let's say the court agrees with the landlord, it doesn't have a mechanism to provide judgment. The only mechanism to get judgment in the show cause is if they don't appear. And so I think it leaves you hanging as to what to do. Again, the twenty one days to schedule a hearing. I'll use my example of what if there's a jury trial demand? We know that's not happening. We just are not gonna be able to schedule that in time.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I think that might be why they took out initially the jury trial demands, but ran into that fescue old constitution.

[Rep. Thomas Burditt (Vice Chair)]: Due to processing that. Sure, tough. On

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: page 23, this is the process about notices of trespass that is indicated to overrule, that the intent is to overrule a case called State v. Dixon. And on page 23, lines nine through 14, it says, notwithstanding any other provisions of law, that this essentially the appeals of this would go to the small claims division, to small claims court. Under 12 b s a fifty five thirty one, small claims that the statute talks about small claims parties may not request claims for relief other than money damages under this chapter. And so it it it appears that possibly what this is entitled what this is intending to do by that notwithstanding any other provision of law clause is to essentially remove fifty five thirty one b from applying in these cases and vest the small claims docket with these particular cases. If that's the intent of the legislature, I would suggest that you might want to be a lot clearer than just notwithstanding any other provision of law because this is not just about saying we're gonna do something different. The question would be, is that enough to actually vest authority in fifty five thirty one b? It may well be, but I can't opine on the eventual legal determinations of whether it is or isn't. But it's very clear that those two butt up against each other because of the limits of small claims. And small claims is just not something we have seen, first of all, a court of appellate. We don't have rules set up for any type of appellate procedures in small claims court. So that would require rulemaking to set up procedures under this.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Ian? Hey,

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: judge. Thank you. I guess my question would be, could this just go to the civil division in an expedited way to allow for the appeal? Think the hope was to try to find some court that could take this type of appeal quickly, which is why small claims was suggested. And that was kind of the intent was to expand the jurisdiction to be able to have this appellate. Yeah, I guess it could be obviously very much clearer. So I'm just curious, too, do you think would that appeal just be given to the civil court? Or do you have another suggestion for a place that an appeal of a no trespass order issued to an invitee could go?

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: The options are civil division, judicial bureau, in the nature of municipal type matter, something like that. The Yeah. Judicial bureau is, when you add statutes and say we're going to now handle them, following closely along is a jurisdictional statute that says judicial bureau has jurisdiction over, and the legislature adds those too. You could put it there.

[Cameron Wood (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Judicial bureau is interesting.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yeah, that makes sense.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Okay, thank you.

[Hon. Thomas A. Zonay (Chief Superior Judge)]: And then the judicial bureau would have to also establish procedures, but wherever it goes, there's gonna have to be established rules to address how we handle these cases. Yeah. On page 25, this starts talking about confidentiality. Now Terry Corsohn is going to talk about this in a moment, but just a couple quick points on this. The section forty eight seventy three lines 10 through 16, this talks about Yep. The records being confidential. And at the end, it says, unless the court orders continued confidentiality, don't have any standards for what we would look at to determine whether or not we're going to issue continued confidentiality. What is the intent of the legislature? What would be the basis that the legislature would want the judges to continue confidentiality or to not? And so that's left unclear. On line 18, I would note, I think the legislative council did mention this, that it was something that a person who was asked about the ejectment history may answer there's no prior ejectment. That's only apparently applies to the tenant who can say that. Certainly landlords can, but there's nothing here that binds a landlord, and a landlord can talk about it freely and openly. And on page 27, lines one through three for access, in addition to access provided for these records, the court can available to any person with a valid court order authorizing access to the ejectment record. I assume that that means that if there's an order from another court, because there would be no mechanism in our court necessarily to open it up because there's no standards as to whether someone can get it. I could see it perhaps in some type of unrelated case where a party to the action and it becomes part of a discovery dispute where someone wants it and tries to get it, they could issue an order. But again, there's no standards to guide the court as to for our courts as to when to open it up. So that's about all I have.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Well, that won't take much to

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Maybe after this.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Thank you, judge. Appreciate that. We'll have another round before as we continue to look at this.

[Rep. Kenneth "Ken" Goslant (Clerk)]: We can have Terry, if

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: if you have a boat, like, pretty short, or we can reschedule or we can do both if you want because because we need to

[Teri Corsones (State Court Administrator)]: for you. I don't mind coming back because I'm always gonna address confidentiality in scheduling. You got repercussions from what's in here.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: And then everything works out fine.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yeah, it's like you're gonna

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: fully support things.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: It's taking a little longer than that to have your issues and concerns.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: You have to leave, right? Yeah, I do.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I'm sorry. I'm about to lose my quorum. I wish. Which is fine. So we'll schedule you when we get back along with other witnesses as well. So, alright. So I wish I could have caught everybody before you left because I we're gonna be adjourned until 09:00 on Tuesday morning when we get back, and I'll make sure I get that message out to everybody that we usually don't adjourn until 01:00 on Tuesdays, but we will adjourn until 09:00 this morning.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: So