Vermont Legislature SmartTranscripts:

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: This Thursday afternoon, February 26, we're now turning our attention to draft number 1.14 of h three eight five. Who's starting? Maria?

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I think so.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: And are we tag teaming with Michelle? Do we have the pleasure of two legislative councils at the same time? This was awesome. It was.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: At least two on this one.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: You can't say that because we

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: need another few committees too.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Okay. Maria Royal with Legislative Council. Couple things. One, I apologize for the green highlighting, which in the printed copy is actually very hard to read online. It's beautiful. But I forgot that you like hard copies, so apologies for that. So in terms of what this draft is, I reviewed draft 1.13 yesterday with Commerce. Those are all of the highlights that are in yellow. Still some to be determined in Commerce, for sure. And then in yellow also were a couple things that Commerce looked at yesterday that this committee had actually proposed. So I'm gonna I'll flag those, and then, we'll pretty much stick to the proposals, that are in response to some of the questions and concerns you had. Okay. So with that said, the very first issue that came up in this committee is on line 13 of the first page, which is whether you had to specify that the police report had to be an official valid copy. And I think the answer is you don't have to actually specify that. It's inherently official. If it's not valid, it's not gonna help you. So then also on page three in yellow, lines twelve and thirteen, one of the issues you raised was ensuring that there was some kind of conflict of interest provision with respect to the qualified third party professionals. So these are people that can sign a certification on behalf. So it just says any of the following individuals who do not have a conflict of interest.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: And that's understood what would constitute a conflict in the presses?

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I think so. I talked to Michelle about this a little bit. If there are specific things you want to call out, I did look actually at a similar provision under a federal law that pertains to federal employees. And it just says don't have a conflict of interest, and then has the guidance with it. But it doesn't specify if you want to say personal financial, financial, it's really a policy choice. There's a concern.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I think it makes sense that it's a conflict of interest. Think there's general understanding. Yes. I don't think we need the list.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Okay. And then so the next page on page four was just addition of the word future. So there are a number of provisions related to the the debtor's disclosure of the perpetrator's identity. So we'll get to some more substantive changes there. But just in terms of what's in the statement of coerced debt, just clarifying that the information will likely result in future abuse to the debtor or a member of the family. And that brings us all the way to the civil legal remedies, which start on page 15. So subsection B, this is if a court finds that debt is for set, what happens then? What does that what actions can occur after that fact? And there is a proposal that was offered to specify That's That what's that?

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Would it be helpful if I do that section?

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: That would be great. Yes. Do you wanna talk about Do

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: wanna go through with any other changes that

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: you I was probably I think the rest of those are the new provisions with exception, which I'll just mention because I'm up here. And that's on page 18, subject highlighted in blue. And this was with respect to the statute of limitations, particularly in an action by a creditor against a perpetrator. I think you wanted more of a kind of a date certain. So what it says here, six years after the date the creditor received the debtor's statement of forced debt and adequate documentation or receive notice of the identity of the perpetrator, whichever is later. Yes.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: But okay. Yep.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: So I think that's it. Michelle's gonna take over the rest. I I well, almost I'm just gonna add one more thing in case you're curious. Commerce added, starting on page 23 on, there's, kind of a new, proposal here, and it's related to protecting individuals from financial exploitation at financial institutions and basically allows allows banks to institute a bank hold on transactions if they think there might be some kind of suspicious activity. Somebody might be victim to a scam. So, anyway, I'm I'm not gonna go into detail, but I just wanted you to know that that had been added on in case you're wondering what the rest of this is all about. So I think that's it for me, and I think Michelle will go through the civil legal remedy provisions.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So can I talk about that new provision now, or do you want to go through those? Which one? The protection from financial exploitation.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Oh, sure. Whatever. And if I can walk through it in more detail if you like.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: No. I don't think so. I'm just looking at page twenty seven and fifteen to 21. The authority to delay a transaction over this section expires at the earlier of fifteen business days after the date of which the covered entity initiated the delay. Well, actually, so let me ask this question. So they can delay for a certain amount of time. Maybe you need to just tell them.

[Charlie Gliserman (Policy Director, Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence)]: I see the court orders. Feel like there's something within your realm.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: There was an explanation in our caucus a week ago, a week and a half ago, that caused me some concern. I just want to make sure that that's not in there. Thank you.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Yeah. And so is it helpful to go back and go through it section by section

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: or broad overview? What's Broad overview, concept.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: So, basically, in general, financial institutions are under an obligation to serve their customers and At their request. All of their assets, etcetera. What this proposal seeks to do is if a bank or financial credit union, financial institution has a concern that somebody might be coming in asking for a large withdrawal or transfer and it seems suspicious, just gives them authority to place a hold on the transaction for fifteen days to maybe have conversations, if possible, with the customer or potentially contact a third party person who may be a trusted contact specified by the customer, a family member of the customer if the financial institution thinks that that's a good thing to do, but basically gives them some authority to try to

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay. So it's a fifteen day period that they can hold or delay the transaction.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Up to fifteen days. So

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: here's my concern then right off in in going to page 27. Now I assume just the way this is structured here, there's not any kind of current case that's involved. This is

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: a person comes to the Yes.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Right. So I think it's really sending a false sense of hope to individuals saying there's a court order directing the release of funds. There's no way anybody within fifteen days is gonna get a court order to release those funds. So I I just think that's it doesn't that just doesn't work.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: So Okay.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yeah. Good question. Mean,

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: that's my feeling too. Was like, oh, shoot. What if somehow I get caught in this. And I'm like, No, I really just need this money. I want the money. So is there any precedent of the bank being on hold for fifteen days and has to go through all these hoops? I'm trying to think of the person who, for treatment, just wants their money because I need to make a payment for x y z.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Absolutely. And I think that's part of the difficulty, and some of it is left to the discretion of the bank. You know, they generally just wanna do what their customers are. And you can hear from the financial entities how they're done, because they have duties and obligations to meet customer requests.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I mean, I'm assuming if somebody's very sophisticated, they can go and they can seek a temporary restraining order in a very, very short order. But that probably should be spelled out a little bit because I don't think worse people, since like 80% of people who go into our civil courts are not represented. So I'm flagging that as a concern for maybe we can have James Silane weigh in on that as well. And Chris and Malay is All right, back to

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: the I'm just flag on the next page too, probably.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yes, yes.

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Same issue.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay. Okay, thank you. So, hope you explained that that was their blog. You're welcome. Now, go through them. Again, appreciate a tag team. It's a very special day for Don't get used to it. What?

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: The record, For Michelle Tiles, Office of Legislative Counsel. So I was looking at a pretty narrow and yet quite unwieldy part of this. And I was working with with Ian in concert with kinda sharing drafts with the network as well as judge on trying to find some language that might be agreeable to to folks. I don't know that we've done it, but thought that we'd get something on the page for conversation. And so I think Maria just talked to you about one change that was made. If you look at, let me see, it's on page four. And this has to do with subdivision 9A on the definition of statement of coerced debt. And you'll see in Romanette five is that just the word future has been added there. This issue about the likely to result in future abuse to the debtor or a member of their family if they disclose the identity of the perpetrator. I just wonder if I could say the term abuse. So you have a definition of domestic abuse in here. And it cross references your definition of abuse in Title 15 under your civil chapter for obtaining an RFA. So remember, it's very specific things around that qualify as abuse according to that definition. I get what is intended here, but then I just want you to keep in mind about this future abuse. Because when you're talking about the group of folks who can perhaps avail themselves of this process, It's folks who may have been victims of domestic violence, but also human trafficking. It could be abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult, especially if you're talking about someone who's elderly. On the books, we have financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult. And so the question that we were trying to kind of bat around here, which is like, what is the danger? So if you're talking about abuse and you're tagging it and you're already defining abuse as domestic abuse, as in what you have in Title 15, which is a fairly high standard. Or are you thinking in terms of you don't want the perpetrator, like there's a danger that the perpetrator is not going to engage in that technical definition of abuse, but they may harass the person, do engage in all kinds of different behavior, threats or all sorts of things that might not qualify necessarily as abuse. So I just kind of bring this up, and I don't have a great solution. It's really a policy decision for you about what you're looking to, what is going to be that threshold that they have to show in terms of what is the danger. And then we can craft language around that. But I just wanted to highlight that here. That that language appears here in the definition, and then the issue comes up again on page like, when you start on the the civil legal remedies. Civil legal remedy starts on page 15. I'll just mention, and not that nobody's wedded to this language, but this morning was pretty crazy. There were a lot that went on, you know, and I know that the bankers had raised some issue around the need to vacate any previous default judgment. That's just kind of a placeholder there, and I'm sure, they can testify and work with Maria on what they want in that space. But I just stuck it there for now. But if you look at page 16 and it's a little hard to read. And Maria is right, it does look beautiful online, actually, that green, more of a spring green. So I might just kind of read it out to you so you can see. So it's amending subsection C. And again, there's a lot of policy decisions in here that in working with Ian, some decisions were made. You don't have to stick with them all, but it's for discussion purposes. So you'll see under existing subsection c, left the first sentence, but struck the language around the creditor not being able to compel the debtor to disclose the identity. And that's because we have new language in a new subsection D. And this is that if the debtor signs a sworn statement disclosing that the identity and contact information for the perpetrator is likely to result in to the debtor or a member of the debtor's immediate family, the creditor may file a motion requesting a hearing to determine the danger of future abuse to the debtor or to a member of the debtor's family if they disclosed information. If the creditor court finds that the debtor meet and it has to be the burden is on the the debtor, and they have to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the perpetrator poses a danger of future abuse if the debtor discloses that information. So if the court finds that the debtor meets the burden, then the debtor shall not be required to disclose the information. However, if the debtor does not meet that burden, then the court shall order the debtor to disclose the identity of, and if known, the contact information for the perpetrator. So there's a lot of there are a lot of policy decisions in there for you about which way to go.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Are those last two sentences necessary? Isn't that Probably not. Yeah, if they prevail, they

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Yes, but sometimes we say it, but you don't have to. It's just making it clear that the court is to order the disclosure. But you don't have to. I'm fine with it out.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I'll find it before I condemn this. Is Pierce. Pierce?

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Just trying to put Did you put Is it on that section?

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yeah. Oh, no. I was just going to say the decision points that we made a decision on just to get something on here was where the burden falls on what's part of this test. So the question was should or should the debtor need to make a motion to have the perpetrator's identity withheld? We decided, no, let's have it. If they filed this document, which is already described earlier, this document, then we're going to say it's got to be the creditor who makes the motion. So, that's a policy. We could change that, but we built it this way for looking at. And then the other one was who's got the burden once the question of whether the perpetrator is going to be concealed or not. It could either be on the creditor to satisfy the burden or the debtor. And we said, let's put it on the debtor because they're the one who is going to be able to actually testify about whether the risk of future harm is there. So I think those are the two questions.

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Then also a big difference from what was there before is that the court can't compel the debtor to disclose.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Isn't the movement usually movement have the burden to prove whatever their

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Well, yeah, but we have a weird prima facie structure to this.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Might as well continue it on. You're kind of moving,

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: but then they don't really have they file all this

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I mean, if you had it, and so if the predator is like Because they're not necessarily always going to maybe want to challenge it. And so it kind of seems like it should be their decision about whether or they will. But really, what are they going to If they don't know the identity of the perpetrator, it seems like it would be hard for them to show in any way by preponderance of the evidence that the person is not facing danger, right? Because they don't have the information And to be able to prove

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: we went over this and maybe that's why you're going to hear that we were talking about, well, the debtors should have to move for the protection, and then they'd have to prove the protection.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yeah, and I think where we moved back was, well, maybe you could have a lot of situations where the creditor never really wants to challenge it. And so if they're making it clear that they file the thing that says that future harm is likely if we disclose, making it so that the debtor doesn't have to make another move again because they've already filed this thing.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So is the sworn statement as part of what that statement is?

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yeah, so back on page four. Page four. Yeah, so they're already filing this as part of their prima facie document.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Right. That makes sense to do. So

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: this is backing up just a little bit further. I'm trying to confirm the piece about abuse that you're saying that we have to better define what that Well, think the piece that I'm gonna ask, though, I see that judge on there. Is it not up to the discretion of the judge right now? And they can

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: determine It is. But I think guidance to the court to be making various determinations. And you remember the earlier language at around the court shall make such orders necessary to protect don't want to say the plaintiff, the debtor. I think the court was concerned that it sounded as though maybe you could read into that, that there could be maybe some shortcut to an RFA in there or whatever. And that's not the intent. So what we've done is like you may boil down the language to be really small, that these remedies are possible if they find that there's danger or future abuse. And certainly hear from Judge Zoning on this, but I think in our discussions, was kind of like, well, in this context, danger of future abuse, what does that mean? And does that need further fleshing out? My concern is that you already use the term domestic abuse in this bill and in the definition section and attracts to Title 15. And I guess my question is, and it would certainly make it easy, is that if you then are fine with it just meaning that Title 15, Section eleven oh one definition of abuse, which I Right. That was my guess is that you wanted it not just to be something that met that particular standard, but that there's all kinds of things that somebody could unleash on someone and retaliation. And I think you want to just be a little clearer about what that would be. So would it be if there's danger of threats? Or you guys have dealt with these kinds of things before, harassment, intimidation, threats to No. This is a little bit already.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Can talk to judge zoning about that. Like, how does he read that and what guardrails might need to be Right. And then

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: I also just wanna mention here is there's language oh,

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: well, I

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: haven't gotten to that yet. Okay. Thank you for that. Let me just go down to the next one because then maybe I suspect this isn't sufficient for the court based on their earlier comments. But I think what Ian and I were trying to do is try to pull everybody's interests together and see if we could meet somewhere in the middle. So there is a new subsection E, which is that in any action involving alleged court's debt upon motion of the debtor, the the court may seal records in accordance with rule nine of, the rules for public access to court records, so it's tracking so it's connecting it to existing court rules, redact personally identifiable information, and direct that or I should maybe make that an or or direct that any deposition or evidentiary hearing be conducted remotely to protect the debtor or a member of the debtor's immediate family from an alleged perpetrator. And then there's language saying that if a debtor is seeking an RFA or voter against stalking or sexual assault, then they go to those sections and they follow those sections just like they are separate because these actions are going to be presumably in the Civil Division. RFAs are exclusively within the Family Division. And so if it's a family member, you would go and you would seek a protection order just like you would normally under those circumstances. There's no alternative route through this process. And so by removing the earlier language about saying kind of generally that the court shall make such orders to protect

[Charlie Gliserman (Policy Director, Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence)]: the

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: debtor, we've removed that and said very specifically, you can seal records, you can order a remote deposition or a evidentiary hearing, and you can redact personally identifying information.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: And just to follow it up, we're also providing some pretty explicit things that a civil court could do that's not outside of what I think is reasonable. And we're identifying that if you want to get so far into protective order that it would be an RFA, that we're identifying the RFA, go do it there, not here. And I'd be curious to hear what Judge Zonnier says, but just that you can move the court right now in a civil proceeding to have a deposition done when somebody is about to die, that you don't think they're going to be alive for this civil trial. And there are ways that you can move the court to work with a plaintiff or something that I don't think it's so outside of the realm of a civil proceeding to seek these remedies.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay. Any other questions for Angela, you've gone through everything that you like to approach?

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Yeah, that's just my little slice. What an important slice.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Who do you think we should hear from next? Do we hear from Charlie or oh. Jenny. Jenny. Do you want judge on it?

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: I do. I have questions already.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Well, know we have questions, but there could be more questions that come up after we hear from Chris and Karen.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Then I guess, yeah, Ashish, do you want to do Charlie and then Chris and then Zanay can wrap it up?

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Yeah. I'll take

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Arsenault first and then if he can be sticking around to hear the rest of the testimony in case something else came up, that would be great. Thank you for appearing, for being here.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: My pleasure. Good afternoon, Tom Zonay, Chief Superior Judge. So I do have what I believe is the most recent version I had looked at, we'll call it the green highlights, which I think were the changes that were for your committee. If you go to page 15 on line 16, this is that language that was added that I think Michelle mentioned might be a placeholder about default judgment. It says the court shall vacate any previous default judgment issued against the debtor related to the coerced debt. I think the word related might be a little broader than you need. Is a specific debt and you know it, so if it just says any previous default judgment issued against the debtor on the coerced debt. So you know it's that specific debt and there's no potential to expand that. For what it's worth, what you're essentially doing with that is under Vermont law, under the way we have in the rules of civil procedure, there's a rule of 55 that deals with default judgments. And there are standards for vacating a default judgment. And those standards depend on whether the default judgment has been issued. So when a motion to vacate is filed after the entry of a default judgment, what's called default, but before the judgment order is entered, because it's a two step process under rule 55, someone is defaulted and then the court issues the order, while oftentimes it's done at the same time, it is a two step process in my rule. And so if it's done in that interim, the question is, is there good cause and the court can vacate it. But where we would normally see it is that if someone, if the judge enters a final judgment order, it falls then under what's called rule 60. And rule 60, 60 b as in boy to be precise, permits relief from final judgment for several enumerated reasons. One of those reasons is number six, and it says any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. And so the question would be, is this statute any other reason justifying relief of operation? In other words, this this kind of overrides that. And so that will be a question for the courts, to address, but it certainly is clear that the legislation, intends for this to be another reason to override a default ment after final judgement. But again, that's a question that could come up.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Judge, just really quickly, could we just say at the end of this pursuant to VRCP rule 60B?

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: Well, if you say pursuant to rule 60B, that's one thing, but they already have that right. And so it seems like the policy you're trying to advance here is that they don't just, that the debtor doesn't just have a right under rule 60, but the debtor has an absolute right that the legislature is creating anew for them to have it vacated. And so if the idea is to have a separate vacation statute as this appears to be, then you don't want to tie it back into 60 because that just puts them what they already had already.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yeah, that makes sense.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: Then on page 16 was the language about the sworn statement that was placed into this new section, lines nine through 21 it looks like. If you go to line 13, it says the debtor shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the perpetrator poses a danger of future abuse to the debtor or to a member of the debtor's immediate family if the debtor discloses the identity of and contact information for the perpetrator. Now I know what that is intended to say, and I have to say that when I read it the first time, I went, wait a minute, does that only apply if they disclose? And that's not the intent. I know what the intent is. So if I could just suggest a tiny change, it would say the debtor shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that if the debtor discloses the identity of and contact information for the perpetrator that the perpetrator poses a danger of further abuse and continue it from there. In other words, just take that last clause and move it up in the center to make it clear that it doesn't only apply if they make a disclosure.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Got that? Okay. I can

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: send that along.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay. I'll turn

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: it into court.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Judge, thank you. Maybe you're gonna get to this. I just wanna make sure you can speak to the abuse piece of it, of your interpretation of that.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: So I your specific question on that, because domestic abuse is is defined under title 15.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Yes. So but in this, it just says future abuse. So would you understand that to be just domestic abuse or would it be any and all abuse?

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: Future abuse is broader than domestic abuse. So it is a broader category. It will require, there's a lot more out there that's potentially support for this type of order.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Okay. Even though my understanding is that domestic abuse is referred in this statute earlier in it, there wouldn't be confusion of like, oh, I should only be thinking about domestic. Because I think we want it to potentially be wider.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: Well, you have defined domestic abuse. And so where the word abuse appears, the question for the court would be, was it an oversight that the legislature did not put the word domestic in there? If it's intentional and the court has to define what the parameters are, under canons of statutory construction, you look to the plain language generally. If a term is not defined, there are Supreme Court cases that say you go to the dictionary definition. And so if you want to define it, that certainly is helpful because not defining it does bring with it the potential that some judges may say it's got to mean domestic abuse. You can't just that that has to be what the intent of the legislature was. And so it it is there's it's not completely clear for guidance as to how the courts are able to take care of it.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: We have an expert that can let us come to you.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay. Hearing we probably need to add a definition of future abuse. Perhaps encompassing what abuse is in a domestic abuse and some ban.

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Abuse means any kind of harm.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Well, me just ask this of the judge. So if it's this broad term of abuse, any kind of harm in this process, presumably, well, I mean, no, just abuse. In this hearing, debtor would have to prove abuse and that would be weighed against the need for that information from the predator. I mean, it's or

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: This statute does not have a balancing test.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: It is, if the court finds abuse of the danger of future abuse, the way that this statute is written, that's it. The court does not get into a balancing test to say, okay, there's a danger of future abuse, but this is a $5,000,000 claim and the danger is pretty low, but the debt is pretty high. We don't get into that balancing test. So once you cross that threshold, 50.1% of abuse, whatever that may be defined as, the court is obligated to, under the way this is structured, to say that the name does not get disclosed. And for example, a quick internet dictionary search, looks like Merriam Webster's abuse. Use something to bad effect or for a bad purpose, misuse. Number two, treat a person or animal with cruelty or violence, especially regularly or repeatedly. Or three, speak in an insulting and offensive way to or about someone. And so the question for the legislature is, do you intend it to be that potentially broad, or is your intent to provide protection from domestic abuse, which itself you've added to and have coercion and control, and you've added a number of areas there that are broader than just physical abuse. And so that's the policy question.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Right, and that's problematic. So that's a rhetorical question, think. So why can't it be tied to the definition of abuse in November? Not at all domestic abuse. It's just that's the definition of abuse. Attempting to cause or causing physical harm, placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm, abuse to children, stalking is defined, sexual assault is defined, and course of controlling behavior. And it doesn't have to be Except, there's one, I'm sorry, there's one difference there, and that is the course of controlling behavior only is between family and household members.

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: You've had, well, I guess it

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: could be something else. Well, somebody

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: If you've had previous relationships, and they're on the other side of the country, but it's

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: your Well, I'm looking at the human traffic. Somebody could and there may be no relationship but there could be any of these kinds of abuses. I

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: think it makes sense. So I think linking it to the abuse definition, it's a policy question. I don't actually think that this should be a balancing test against the debt.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: No, but if there's not a balancing test, it has to be a higher standard. I totally agree with you. And we're going to go broader than just household? Well, I don't know. As if you're going sign I it to abuse served on a jury where the person had done the bad thing, but they weren't in the household. And so we had to work in the building. Right. But was that coercive controlling behavior? The other Well, okay. All between family or household members. So that part has to change. But I don't know how you incorporate Max. Think

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: this is a side conversation.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Person? No, I'm asking people.

[Michelle Childs (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: And I guess maybe just getting some clear direction from you. I think when we were discussing this earlier, we were thinking that perhaps the committee's intent was for it to include things like threats or doxing or doing things that are essentially more like harassing, intimidation, things like that, that don't necessarily fall neatly into the Title VT definition of abuse. It's totally, absolutely your decision around, and I think having some kind of definition of, I think maybe they would say future abuse.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: And I wasn't quite sure, so we kind of left it.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay, yeah.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: I do have a thought as you're talking, and that is, if the concern is that domestic abuse under 11,011 requires between a family or household member, and you're looking at defining something different here for the word abuse, you might, and I haven't thought this through because this is just on the fly, but you could theoretically define the word abuse as has the same meaning as provided in 15 VSA 11,011 comma, except that it need not be an occurrence, the acts need not be between family or household members, and therefore you have domestic abuse, which family or household members, and if you have another definition for the word abuse, you're getting what I think representative Goodnow referred to as a higher standard, and you can make clear that it doesn't we don't have that clause about family or household members.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Judge, the definition of abuse that you're coming up with are, I don't know if the question is going beyond the

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: The standard in the bill does not require that the future abuse have anything to do with the core's debt. A finding of abuse.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: That's what we're doing. No, no, that's it. So it's a little bit different. It's a whether to turn over the name of the perpetrator if there could be proof that doing so would cause this other abuse, including threats or placing somebody in imminent serious physical harm. The whole idea is we're disclosing the fact that the victim, the debtor has had this coerced debt holding. So it's not really related to that. It's kind of a little bit different at that point. Does that make sense? So this is after the court's debt. Right. Right. Court's debt has been determined.

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: The court

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: has found

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: look at it totally different than than most people in here. But if we have if we if we we have somebody else's quarters, we have a perpetrator to be a I I don't know if it could be done at that point. An RFA is in place and we've done a lot of work on RFAs through the years and I think everybody would agree that they work and we wouldn't even have to go in this direction, that's just why The perpetrator needs to be out there, we won't have to deal with all this other abuse stuff.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: Certainly, those are policy decisions. Yeah.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Trying to strike the hearing back, think that's a very real concern and I think trying to strike the balance here by

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yeah, but it's not a balance. There's no balance between the two beliefs. Alright, let's go back to judge zone A.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: I'm not mistaken, you also had oh, I would also note that the definition of abuse under eleven oh one, if you you tied it back into that, the stalking definition from Title 12. And so that is a little broader than just, again, physical violence. That talks about course of conduct. It means that someone engages purposefully in course of conduct directed at a specific person, knowing or should have known that it would cause them to fear for safety, suffer substantial emotional distress. So that also brings in that potential into the definition. There was a question, I believe, on page 27, the language about the fifteen days, am I correct?

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yes. Looked at it.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yeah, you have anything else? We didn't have anything on page 17 or anything? That was all for that section? I'll make sure.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: Again, it's page 16, oh, I'm sorry, page 17. The only thing I would do is on line two, I'd get rid of the word presiding. It is the court. We know it's gonna be the court. The new language does it takes it away from the concern that I had expressed about the court having to serve as the advocate, if you will. It puts the burden on the debtor to file something to say we want relief. It removed the language that was difficult to implement because it was with questions about authorization, scope and limits, and what it now says is that if they file, if the debtor files, the court can seal records. It ties it, it tethers it to the existing statute, the existing court rules on how to seal records. It also talks about some other provisions of the law that other provisions that a judge could order. And I think representative Goodnow correctly noted that courts can order certain types of restrictions and provisions when we're dealing with discovery and court matters. And so they are the type of orders that we could enter anyway generally, but it's very clear to say this is the type of orders that you can order. And I don't know, I think it's not necessary to have lines 10 through twelve, thirteen there about a debtor seeking relief may file. It doesn't do any harm to say they can file for those orders, but it certainly is not.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: All right, jumping to page 27 then.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: Page 27, do I correctly understand your question is, is it realistic for an order, everything to be taken care of in fifteen days?

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yeah, I mean, it is with the temporary restraining order presumably and all that, but are they gonna be able to, it seems to be kind of a false promise to some extent to put it in.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: I would concur that the idea that this is going to be a readily used, easy process for someone to say, okay, we're putting a hold on this because we think that there's a problem with this transaction, we're doing protective measures, and now we have fifteen days, they've got to get their attorneys involved, they've got to take steps, so I don't know if that's really going to work. Now, a difference is however, that if they take that step and put the notice out, there is the very real potential that there could be a financial exploitation complaint filed within that fifteen days. That's much more realistic. And so if there's a financial exploitation complaint filed for an elder abuse situation, the court could for protection.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: But this would be the person seeking the money wanting a court order so that they can get their money earlier, but you're talking about something different.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: No, what I'm saying is, let's say an individual goes, are an elderly individual who goes to the bank to get money. As I understand this, the idea is the bank can say, there's a problem, we think there's an issue here. They watch them, whether they pull up in a car with some, whatever it may be, the bank has a good faith belief that this this person is the victim of either actual or or attempted financial exploitation. The bank says, we're putting a pause on this. The bank has fifteen days. That individual themselves might not file something. The bank can certainly contact AG or some state entity and say, we have a concern, or local police department, whatever it may be to contact and say, we've got a concern something might be going on here. That could lead them to go to the person's son, daughter, family member, husband, whatever it may be. That has the potential to lead to potentially a complaint for financial exploitation, And that's all I'm saying is that that could take place quicker than preliminary injunctions or something like that, because we do have that process for that we type of

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: in fact keep upon a court order directing the muni's response because that could go through that case that you're describing.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: The authority to delay a transaction expires at the earlier of fifteen business days, and so if fifteen days go by and nothing happens, it's over. If covered entity decides, oh, we were mistaken, everything is okay, or upon a court order directing the release of the funds. My thought was, if the concern is fifteen days isn't enough time for us to make the filing with the court to extend things or to take care of things, there is a process in place that does address financial exploitation that theoretically could come into play. The covered entity may not have any knowledge and anything they do might not bring it into play, but there is that potential.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: One related question is that if we didn't have the upon a court order directed to release of funds, that doesn't mean that that wouldn't be an available remedy. Mean, that person could go and seek, it's just unlikely. The whole thing just seems unlikely. But I don't need that language of that upon a court order because if the court comes in and orders that the funds should be released, the funds have to be released. You don't have to put it in statute.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: You don't. The only reason you might wanna put it in there is because there's three things that happen. Either there's this pause, there is satisfaction that everything's okay, or the court says release it. But you are correct. If a court orders it released, you don't need a statute to say the court can order that.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I just think that this concept was oversold at the caucus when they were talking, no, you could just go get a court order if didn't have it released. No, baby. Thank you, judge. Anything else?

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: No, that's all I have, unless there's any further questions.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I appreciate it, I look forward to having you weigh in on the other bill tomorrow afternoon.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: Terry and I will both be praying. I think I'll be remote, but Terry and I will both be available. Thank you.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Thank you very much, judge. Thank you.

[Hon. Tom Zonay (Chief Superior Judge, Vermont Judiciary)]: Great day. Chris,

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: don't you join us, Chris? Are we getting any closer to satisfying

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: your concerns? Yes. For the record, Christina, you're president from Bankers Association. So I'm just gonna quickly go through the bill because as Maria and Rochelle were talking about some changes, I was putting kind of check marks next to some items.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay. We'll do every change that doesn't have anything to do with us. You don't wanna do that right now? No. Great.

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: Well, you do have some questions that came up that are in y'all. Yes. Yeah. Okay. Page one, unofficial valid. I put a check mark to that. That's fine. Page three, where you've got forward to seeing what you come up with for the abuse definition, and we'll just circle back with you when you decide what that is.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Abuse definition that was suggested to have an offline discussion, there's interested parties in here that I don't know might want to be involved in this. I think actually where we've landed in a conversation with Judge Zoning is that we're going to use the definition of abuse that's in 15 BSA eleven oh one and just make it clear that it doesn't have to be between fans and your household members. That's what I thought too. Yeah. Yeah. Just in case We'll have we'll have Preston and Robert. Just in case that conversation still happens. I just wanna

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: We'll participate in any dialogue that you establish. Appreciate that. Yeah. So then I'm going page 15. So this morning, I got an email questioning the issue of default judgment, which I shared with representative Goodnow. What I'm checking out and and the individual got back to us and offered two suggestions to modify the definition in core's debt, dealing with the judgment. We since sent the language that's on page fifteen, sixteen, and 17 to the individual for his review, and I'm waiting to hear back whether that satisfies it or whether we would still request the language that I have given you. It's not striking, it's adding in the definitions. So if you wanna check about that.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: The one thing I wanted just to ask is when you send this language or maybe you can supplement when you send before you sent this language to that individual, the jurisdictional question. So his initial language was a lot broader, like any default judgment, not specifically tied to a Vermont court. And I don't know how that would work with a ruling on a course debt in a Vermont court for default judgment outside of Vermont. So we can just flag that for him when he's looking at it, just so they understand that that's part of why we narrowed it with this filler language.

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: So because this is outside of my area, can you just help me to understand that if we have a customer who resides in Florida, for example, and the customer were raising an issue of coarse debt, is the Vermont court going to deal with that or is a Florida bank going to deal with that? That I just don't know. In the banks in Vermont. In the banks in Vermont.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: They can bring it in Vermont. You'd have Okay. Right. I mean, I think that's how it would work. We can get a smarter person to talk about

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: it than me. Only because we obviously have banks in Vermont, but we have customers all over.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yeah, I think if the default judgment was brought in Vermont, which would make sense if that's where they are and they're bring here, then this would satisfy it. I guess I would just I don't have the answers for you, but just that's kind

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: of the

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: Clarifying in the Vermont jurisdiction, not a broader

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yeah, and like how Yeah.

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: Okay. On page 15 in On line 18, creditor shall have a cause of action against the perpetrator. This was a question representative that you had asked me the other day, what do other states do in this area? And I provided to representative Goodnow a sampling of what the other states have done. What I'm trying to decipher is whether this one sentence is sufficient compared to a paragraph that is representative in those other bills. And again, I shared that with you. The more clarity we have, the better. I'll just give you an example of one paragraph. And in this paragraph, the claimant is credited. A person shall not cause another person to incur a coarse debt. A person who causes another person to incur a coarse debt in violation of subdivision shall be civilly liable to the claimant, that's us in that bill, for the amount of the debt or a portion thereof determined by a court to be coarse debt plus claimant's attorney's fees and costs. That's obviously much longer than this sentence that you have here. So, we would just want to seek as much clarity as possible because that's the only person, if they are known, that we can go after. And then I jump to page 15 and looking at what has been established here. And if understand this correctly, as described today, a sworn statement that's provided by the debtor expressing concern about potential abuse, future abuse, family harm, etcetera, and the danger that exists. A creditor goes to court related to that question, the burden of proof is on the debtor by a preponderance of the evidence in the way the judge had reworded that. I don't see any difficulties with that from our perspective. So Second to check? Can I just see the judge rewritten my words?

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: The senior. I'm a senior. And

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: on page 17, the issue of sealing the court records in order to protect the individual family is completely understandable and and outside of thoughts or comments that would be appropriate for us to offer, I think. And I didn't see any issue on page 18 with the language that's in blue regarding the timeframes that you all have established in or or trying to tie it to a time frame, if you will. And then just go to since you've had the conversation about it, Maria adequately described to you, the concept about the transaction hold is one that we've seen adopted in other states, and it's all about fraud. And the notion is that my mother walks in, she is exhibiting unusual behavior because maybe somebody's on the phone in her pocket or pocketbook, and she wants to take out $10,000 and she never does that. The notion behind the hold is to provide a time for one, a cooling off, if you will, and a reflection on perhaps her part, but more importantly, an opportunity for the financial institutions to have a conversation with her And if need be, with, as we do local law enforcement, Secret Service, FBI, whoever, to try and bring them to the table to say, Hey, mom, this is not a good thing. Part of that is also we often engage with adult protective services and the notion there is if they want to step in, our thought here was not from the perspective of the customer immediately going to court and trying to get some relief, was in the event, if there was a court order, we would have to respond to that court with ATS or whoever.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I'm fine with it. It's just that this was wildly oversold in our public caucus that, well, you can just go to court and you know, get the court ordered to do this. That was where I understand where it come from. And I think this is great. This is a great part of this bill. But just wanted to camp down some expectations Hopefully, what that meant. But it sounds like we should keep it there and perhaps just when it's being started, I will make sure that whoever's presenting this part right. I think it's one

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: of those things where a place card holder in the event that there was an order. In the unlikely event. Yeah. Right. But that's the notion being made.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yeah. No. I understand.

[Chris D’Elia (President, Vermont Bankers Association)]: So again, I'm just checking up on that definitional piece. We'll wait to see what you come up with for abuse language and how that section was created with the judge's comments.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Excellent. So there's all three items. Yeah, and yeah,

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I've got them really down to. Great, Thank you. Any other questions for Chris? Alright. We'll hear from Charlie, and then I guess we'll have to go to four. I'm hoping that it stands. No. I'm just kidding. I'm excited to go to four.

[Maria Royal (Office of Legislative Counsel)]: Thank you.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: That's right. We do have to get out

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: there in time. In that case, Charlie, hustle.

[Charlie Gliserman (Policy Director, Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence)]: I'm I'm always hustled. I'm

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: just joking. I'm very excited for your testimony.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I'm nothing single. Always, Mason.

[Charlie Gliserman (Policy Director, Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence)]: Good afternoon.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Good afternoon.

[Charlie Gliserman (Policy Director, Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence)]: I'm Charlie Lisserman. I'm the policy director with the Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence. I will be brief. Overall, we feel comfortable with the revisions in green. I would like to speak to two questions that were up for discussion in the committee today. First, on the language that Chris referenced around a creditor's rights and right of action, we don't have a strong preference between the language that is in this draft right now and other states' language on creditors' rights. I would defer to the committee and to legislative counsel about whether further clarification on that language is needed. On the question of the definition of abuse in future abuse, I really appreciate the discussion, and I agree that it would be problematic to confine that future abuse to interactions between family or household members or current or former dating partners, because this bill can be protective of a vulnerable older adult who is facing exploitation from a caregiver that doesn't live with them and has never had a romantic or sexual relationship with them. So I am also thinking on the fly, but I believe that Judge Soni's suggestion would provide the coverage needed for all of the populations that are served by this bill. I think that this provision is very important, and there are some insights from other states that I just wanted to share briefly with you about why. What I hear from advocates in other states about the survivors that are using methods of relief like this, it's roughly two groups of survivors. It's survivors who are at a point where they have sought safety and they feel comfortable taking at stuff like this. And those are the survivors who might be less likely to need safeguards within the process or maybe more comfortable disclosing the name of a perpetrator. There's also a second group of survivors who apply for coarse debt relief because they truly have no other options. They are in a domestic violence shelter and they can't find permanent housing because their credit score is so damaged. And this is the only way that they can get out of an emergency situation. And so I think for those survivors, this kind of language that covers all the populations serving this bill is very important. And I appreciate the city's consideration. I do not have any other comments for you all, but I would be happy to answer any questions or speak to the issues that are coming up for

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: you. Congratulations.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: The collaborations, everybody.

[Charlie Gliserman (Policy Director, Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence)]: Thank you very much.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Thank you. Thank you so much. So just in the last few minutes that I have, just to touch base on a couple of things. So ten, 744849, those should be on the latest agenda as well. And then we'll start in on a drive by that we have to do, and I apologize for the tiny illness, on the landlord tenant bill. That's H732. Anybody who wants to look at that, most of that 33 pages does not have to do with us. If anybody wants to look in advance, let me know and I'll tell you what we're gonna be looking at. And we have Ashley Bartley, Representative Bartley coming in to give us an introduction to that at 11:30. And then in the afternoon we have four witnesses, Judge Zone. But we have a walk through by Cameron Wood, Judge Zone, and a person from the landlord tenant side of the equation, well, from the landlord, but then from the tenant side as well. So next, in case I don't have time, I guess we can talk a little bit about this tomorrow since we only have five minutes. I want to talk about the week that we're going to be when we get back, the week to put a cross over. But we can talk about that. What were the three buildings again? It's 07:44, that's the rule, fourth hand, the Punjab language, 08:49. So we will adjourn until tomorrow, okay we're not.