Vermont Legislature SmartTranscripts:

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Committee this Thursday morning, February 5, that we're turning our attention to h five seven eight, an act relating to penalties and procedures for animal cruelty offenses. And we are looking at draft number 2.1. And we'll have a walkthrough. Over to you, Eric. Thank you for joining us this morning.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Hi, good morning. Morning. And thank you. It's Eric Fitzpatrick with the Office of Budget Swipe Council here as Chair LaLonde said to do a walk through version 2.1 of the proposed House Committee strike all amendment to H five seventy five. I appreciate being able to testify remotely this morning. Something came up at home. So thanks for being flexible to the committee. I appreciate that. As far as the new draft that you're looking at, you'll see that the as is often the case, the yellow highlights indicate where some of the changes are between the previous draft that the committee looked at and the one that's in front of you now. So I would probably focus on the yellow highlights if that makes sense to you,

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: you.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Sure. Absolutely. So taking a look then at the substance of the changes, you'll see that the first couple are over on page two. And this is within the definition section. And the first one is really a technical one on the top of page two. That's just the, when the definition of sexual conduct with an animal was expanded, which has been the case since the beginning of the bill, since it was first introduced. When you add new conduct to the type of conduct that's prohibited, you generally include a clause that says without a bonafide veterinary or animal husbandry purpose just to cover things like maybe artificial inseminations or that sort of thing in which there may be an explanation for the conduct that makes sense in the context. So that's really a technical thing that gives just an oversight that that language wasn't there to begin with. So the second definition you see is a definition of working with. And you may recall this is here because when the committee was talking about the ability of the accord to impose sanctions other than criminal sanctions other than incarceration and criminal fines, you know, for example, it can impose limitations on the animal owners ability to either possess or have control of or reside with an animal. And the committee wanted to include working with as one of the sanctions that the court could impose, but it was going to do that in the previous draft, it was just in one particular place. And then the committee realized that well, it really made sense to have that prohibition potential prohibition apply throughout all those options that the court has for what it can impose on the animal owner. So it made sense instead, if you turn the head for just a moment, or I'll just point it out to you on a slice half the term, but if you turn ahead to page 11, you'll see that that's where the working with definition was in the previous draft. So in other words, this isn't new language, it's primarily just moved from subdivision F on page 11, which on your draft should be entirely struck through. Is that right? Perfect. So it's struck through there. In other words, so it doesn't just apply to that one particular court authority. Instead, if you just move into the definition section, going back to page two now, that way anytime you use the phrase working with and any other place in this sub chapter, it will be referring back to this definition, which is the same language that you looked at previously anyway, with two additions, which you'll see in bold on lines five and six. So other than those two bolded phrases, the language is exactly the same as the definition of working with before. So what's added there, see working with means working or volunteering. So that reflects a discussion the committee had, they wanted to make sure that volunteers were included here in any capacity, including as an independent contractor. Again, something the committee talked about and wanted to make sure that this definite definition of working with covered. And then after that, it's just the exact same language that you saw before that requires a person to be in contact with an animal, including, and then it lists a number of potential places that the person could be working or volunteering at that would be covered, but that's not an exclusive list. Generally, it is always interpreted not to be exclusive unless you say so, which you don't. So that there could be other things that aren't in the list that will ultimately count as working lists.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: All set with that one?

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I think so. Any questions? Yeah.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: All right. So now we're moving on to page five. And this is the definition of misdemeanor animal cruelty. Remember the crime can be a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the type of conduct involved. And there's this lengthy list in the existing statute that starts way back on page two goes all the way through page five under current law. It looks like 11 different types of conduct that would constitute misdemeanor animal cruelty. And you recall that what's going on in the bill at least partially is that definition of sexual conduct is expanded. So that's one way that the description of what constitutes misdemeanor animal cruelty is enlarged in age five seventy eight by expanding the definition of sexual conduct with an animal to include, you see it's on the top of page five, visual images. Remember the committee talked about that. So it's not just the sexual conduct with an animal, it's visual images of sexual conduct with an animal that are covered. You see there's two highlighted words because they're two words. This is the same as the language that the committee saw last time with two words added. And this is because as Chair LaLonde mentioned last time, when you regulate visual images, the First Amendment to the Constitution is certainly implicated. And I spoke at great length with Hillary, and we did a lot of research on this topic, wanted to make sure that the language was as tight as possible to withstand any potential First Amendment challenge. And that's why we've added those two words. Knowingly covers because we obviously don't want to cover a situation, for example, where someone's got these obscene images. And they didn't realize they had, you know, for all units, someone puts a flash drive in your pocket without you realizing that it's even there. Technically, that's possession, but you want someone to actually know that they have it. So that's why the word knowingly is added. And that is standard practice and all regulation of obscenity visual images, it always has to be knowingly. And that's actually required constitutionally.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So Before you go on, Ken has a question.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Good morning, Eric. Yeah, good morning. And not to back up, but just to go back to the page two, what we were just going over. Because we've had like the horse issue and stuff like this, I'll be asking this question again, or somebody will take me up on it, But like, does that section right there, is that gonna cover that from not so they can't keep skirting around that situation anymore?

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: One Yeah, I think so. The situation where you're talking about, for example, someone working at a horse sporting facility or volunteering or something like that?

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: No, I'm talking about the people that have the horses that didn't take care of them and they just moved from one town to another, to another and all that. Is that language suffice to take care of situations like that?

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yeah, I think so. I think if they're trying to, it doesn't matter what town they're doing it under this language, if it's at least it

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: I'm not saying town, I'm saying the persons, the individuals that are, what's the word that keep doing it over and over and over for some reason with these four animals.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Like repeat offenders kind of thing?

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Yes, yes. Thank you. Great.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Then absolutely. Yes. Yep. There'll be certainly covered by that. And there'll be covered as we go forward. You'll see that with the repeat offenders get even steeper penalties and these prohibitions on them working with having animals in their house taking care of them, those become mandatory. So if they do it again, they're gonna be subject to even steeper penalties.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Okay. And enforcement. Yes, exactly. Okay. Thank you. Yep.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: So the page five that we were looking at was the visual depiction piece. And so I was just mentioned the knowingly and the other word that gets added is obscene. And this is also an attempt to make clear how this is going to be. This will stand up to any kind of First Amendment challenge, just making clear that the visual images would be because obscenity is carved out from the First Amendment. In other words, it's not subject to First Amendment protection. So if something is obscene, it's a categorical exception to First Amendment protection. So you make clear as as many statutes do with respect to regulation of visual images, that it's obscenity that's being prohibited. That also has an added benefit of regulation of obscenity also permits regulation of what you might call virtual images or artificially created images or, you know, it's not necessarily a real person, but it's one that AI is used to create or drawings, that sort of thing. Those actually, if they count as obscene, they can be regulated. So as a, you know, that's been a concern, I think that people have had with this topic and others related to it that, you know, because these days with the way technology is that a lot of these images can be created artificially. But if it's obscenity, can still be regulated, even if it's an AI or artificially created image. So that's the another reason to make clear that these are the types of images that are being prohibited under the under the criminal statute. Moving on, you'll see that so these are two other types of conduct that are being regulated as misdemeanor animal cruelty. You did have number 12 with some, there's a new language ad, but you did have this in the previous draft, which is that if a person possesses, because remember one of the things the court can do as we were just talking about represent Goslant is that court can say that you can't prohibit, sorry, you can't possess animals in the future on the basis of this criminal conduct that you're having right now. But the committee realized since it was, know, expanding that authority to beyond possessing, the court can also prohibit ownership, caring for residing with having custody, etc. That it made sense also to make when you're talking about the misdemeanor criminal offense here, a person does any of those things while you have a court order in effect saying you can't, excuse me, that constitutes misdemeanor animal cruelty as well. So that's number 12. Number 13 is an addition. Before

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: you move on, I'm sorry. Ian has a question on number 12.

[Rep. Ian Goodnow (Member)]: Yep. Sorry, Eric to interrupt

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: just really quickly. Don't remember, did we talk about if we wanted to tie it only to 353B or just any court order that prohibits owning, caring for, or having custody of an animal or working with an animal? No, I think it would be any order. In my thought being like a condition of release or probation condition.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Oh, yeah. I remember talking about that. Yep.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yep. So we'll need to modify that.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yep. Yeah, you could just strike those words on line six. Issue pursuant to subsection three fifty three b.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: By court order, just by court. By court order. Yep.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Got it. Thank you. Yeah, so another so in addition to the misdemeanor animal cruelty crime is also proposed to be added in number 13, which is again, so you've got a, you may remember that the existing, we're going to see some modified language, but the existing statute, another one of these sanctions that the court can impose is to require the person to consent to periodic unannounced visits by a humane officer. So in other words, the idea being, hey, you've committed animal cruelty in the future, we're going to require you to allow a humane officer to come visit you and make sure you're not either complying with court orders or you're not committing any more instances of animal cruelty. So that's existing law. The proposal here is to expand the misdemeanor definition to include refusing to comply with one of those orders. So in other words, the court has said, hey, you have to allow these unannounced periodic visits and you refuse to allow the person when they turn up, for example, that's going to be misdemeanor animal cruelty violation. That's the proposal here. Okay. All right. So turning the page, page six. Now we're talking about as I just mentioned, the visual images piece of the sexual conduct with animals prohibition. So that's just the same change on page six that I already mentioned. Because remember in the, in the felony context of these sexual conduct with animals criminal offenses, it's a felony when it involves a minor. So that's why you have all these separate offenses listed again. It's a misdemeanor if it's with an adult, it's with a minor, it's a felony, five year felony. So that's why these are all set out one more time, but in order to make everything consistent and to obviously adjust the constitutional point I raised earlier, you make the same change here. It's line 16 page six to make clear that it's knowing possession of these visual images and that the visual images are obscene.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Okay.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Right. So now we'll move on to talk a little bit more about what I was just mentioning that the other sanctions, not just the criminal sanctions, but the other prohibitions that the court can impose when someone's been convicted of animal cruelty starts over on page eight, really page nine. These are the discretionary sanctions. Remember you have some some group of sanctions that the court may impose and another group that are mandatory the court shall impose. Generally speaking, those are divided up based on whether it's a first offense or not. Know, typically first offenses or a discretionary court may impose these sanctions. If it's a second offense, they're required. So again, really just language consistency here to reflect what the committee wanted covered. It's on page nine. And this is for first time misdemeanor offenses, lines 12 to 15. Currently, the court can order any future right to own possess or care for an animal. But you're adding because you wanted to make sure that it included other situations where the person might be in contact with an animal so they could be residing with the animal have custody of or work with. And that ties back to the working definition that we were looking at in the definition section. And that same change is made on line 17 for the aggravated animal cruelty offenses. So again, just scoping in those other types of ways that a person might have contact with an animal that a court can prohibit it, can prohibit if you got one of these criminal convictions.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Okay. Angela has a question on that. Yep.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Should we, I think I missed this earlier, but should we also add that same language

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: in Romanette three,

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: nineteen twenty, twenty one, where it says, own,

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: possess,

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: or care for livestock or poultry, should it just have the same own, possess, care for, reside with, have custody with, or work with livestock or poultry?

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yeah. I mean, I think that the idea there, if I remember right, was to not, for example, someone who was engaged in farming, who may have been.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: I know you don't reside with most, you know, livestock or poultry. So maybe not that one. But I just was wondering for consistency sake if it or if it's fine.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yep. I mean, certainly couldn't hurt. So maybe for would put

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: it in yeah. I would have to have changed. I agree with And this is one section that the agriculture committee will be looking at. That's yeah.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yep. Sounds good. And consistency generally can be good.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I'm sorry. Ken has a question too.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Hey. Eric, why did we on line 14, why did we change that language not less than five years to of up to five years. Why did we change that? I don't recall. I don't I don't recall that.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So so this was the first offense where it would be discretionary for the court. And you'll see that there's a mandated not less than five years for a second offense. We wanted to have different levels, a little more flexibility, particularly with the first offense. Okay.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yep. Thank

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: you. Yep,

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: you bet. So yes, so I had the residing custody, etcetera, language livestock poultry, and there'll be several places, I think, that will do that. So I'll try and cover all of them, and then I'll probably forget one. So I'll depend on you to catch me on that.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: It's team effort.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Thank you. I appreciate it. So that brings us to page 10, which is another one of these permissive sanctions that the court may impose when someone's been convicted of animal cruelty, in this case not required but discretionary. And this has to do with the counseling, treatment, etcetera. And there's some modifications proposed here to clarify exactly what kind of programs the person has to do and whether they, for example, if you look at line one, page 10, the current language for animal cruelty prevention was participate in a program and I think the idea was to beef that up and have it be successfully complete an animal cruelty prevention program. So that's the proposed change there. Subdivision or sorry, Romanette two, thank you. I think that's my first use of that term.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Yeah, doesn't it? Yeah.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: I enjoyed it.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: That was nicely done. So I have a question, and this may be for the witnesses, that it didn't dawn on me when we made that change. What happens if the person doesn't successfully complete this? I mean, I can understand having the successful completion for the provisions regarding lifting the sanction of ownership and the like, but mandating successful completion, I'd want to hear from witnesses on whether that actually works or not.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Doesn't. It's than Brandon's

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: drug

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: driving. But it probably

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So, yeah, it may work, but I just wanna flag that for what happens if we don't. Okay, Eric. Go ahead.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: No, no problem. Sounds good. So yeah, the next ROMAT two has to do with education. So again, it's the same issue, just pointing out to clarify as successfully complete. Witnesses can talk about that concept. And then what is it that they have to complete? It's a little more specific. It's an animal abuse education accountability program approved by the director of animal welfare. And then the last two issues involve counseling. And you'll see that the way the language currently read it was rather general, obtain psychiatric or psychological counseling. That's pretty much all it said. So this is more specific and says psychiatric or psychological treatment with a clinician licensed in the state of Vermont. So it's providing more detail there as to what type of counseling. Again, remember this is discretionary. It's not a must that the court has to order it, but if they do, this is the guiding language that would apply.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So Barbara has a couple of points of input on this.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: So for D, little one, I? Roman and I. Roman and I, sorry. Love to have that approved by the director of animal welfare as well, because there could be there were programs and there were programs, and we need to make sure that one is a legitimate program that actually has some evidence or evaluation component. So the same language that's in Roman ii would go in Romani?

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Romanii. Romanii. Sorry, I know.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: That's what I do.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: For obtaining psychiatric or psychological, I think it probably needs to say psychiatric, psychological or mental health treatment with a clinician licensed. Because again, I worry that clinician licensed in the state of Vermont would only refer back to a psychiatrist or psychologist, which is the minority of licensed clinicians.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: You're in Romanette 3 now?

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Yes, I'm at Romanette three.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yes. I just was looking for another reason to say Romanette, but yes, I got that. I have the one too representative Rachelson. Thank you. I'm jotting that down. So lines nine and ten, that's just moved. That's not new. You say the court may impose the cost of programs or counseling. If you look down at the very bottom of the page, lines 18 through 20, that sentence has just moved up there. I think the idea was that the committee wanted that imposition of cost to imply for adults, but not for juveniles. So that's why that's up there. We're done. That was in the previous draft as well.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: And line 11 needs to change from romanette two to romanette five.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yes. Exactly. Thank you.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Guys are really having fun with it. You

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: just learned this new word.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Oh, I can tell.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yes. So enrollment at five, this has to deal with the juvenile psychiatric mental health counseling. So remember this separated out here and has a slightly different process, but still similar to what's an existing law. So you'll see it provides that the there's a evaluation first. So first, there's a court may order an assessment, sorry, to determine whether therapy or treatment is needed. And if the screening indicates that therapy is needed, then the court may order the juvenile to satisfactory complete. And that's, I suppose brings up the same issue that Chair of Alon was mentioning about successfully complete that you may want to at least bookmark for a moment to see whether that's those are the words you want to use or not on line 17. Although on this case- Also

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: as Barbara's concern, right? Right. Probably should Two things. One is it could be a psychiatric or psychological assessment. I didn't mean to give psychiatrists. Say that part again, sorry. I see this psychological. So line fourteen, fifteen, psychiatric or psychological assessment.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Oh, okay, yep.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: And then if screening indicates that therapy is needed. I don't know if we need to repeat a clinician. Don't know if we need to add with a I guess we're debating about if a mental health clinician needs to be in there. It doesn't need to be a mental health clinician, but I don't want Well, if it just says clinician, doesn't it cover I guess it does. I guess it does. It may, though, just reference back that this psychologist or the psychiatrist needs to do it.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Right. Well, I've got to put a check there. If you want to change the language, you can just ponder it and let me know. But I think it is true, right? Because Representative LaLonde was saying the clinician term would include a mental health clinician currently. All right. So turning over to page 11, subdivision E. Now we're talking about what I referred to earlier. Periodic unannounced visits in the future that the court can order if someone gets convicted to one of these offenses. So the clarification here is, well, how long is that going to last? And when is that order going be in effect? Because it's a little bit unclear under the existing statutory language as to whether or not those periodic unannounced visits can happen during the period that the person is actually prohibited or does it can only apply to afterward? I think the committee wanted to make clear that, hey, you know, these visits can happen while the person is prohibited from possessing, caring for, etc, as well as for some period afterwards. So that's why you see the new language starting on line five, when can these periodic unannounced visits be ordered during the period and for up to one year after expiration of the period that the defendant is prohibited from owning, possessing, etc. So it would apply during that period of time because remember that period also has there some court discretion as to how long the court can decide that that's going to be in effect. So this is phrased generally enough so it can accommodate whatever time period the court chooses to say, oh, well they're gonna, you know, they choose a year then that's what would get roped in by this statute. And then not only would it be for that one year that they're prohibited from possessing line six and for up to one year after expiration of the period. So if they're prohibited from possessing for a year, the court could then say and for one year after that, you're going to have to permit these periodic inspections to make sure that you're not abusing animals anymore. So that's the idea here. Bottom of page or not bottom, but the, we already looked at the language on page 11 lines, 11 through 17. That's the working with language that got moved up to the definition section. So now moving on, these are the now moving into the mandatory sanctions that you'll see the very bottom of page 11, line 18, you see the court shall. So these are the mandatory sanctions over on the page 12. And really these are just the same, we're looking at parallel changes that you just looked at in the permissive sanctions are also going to be made here in the mandatory sanctions, the same language that you've already looked at. We'll be able to move through these pretty quickly. The first one on page 12 lines two and three, that's just technical. That's a typo, that language, the livestock or poultry exception is in lines four to six. So it was inadvertently repeated there twice. Further down on page 12, again, making sure that residing with having custody of working with is included the same way you'd looked at in the previous previous permissive sanctions section. Same thing again, over on page 13, you'll see the expansion to residing custody working with again in the future orders that the court may issue. We're now talking about, you may recall this is a slightly different topic and this is the idea that if someone is subject to one of these court orders that prohibits them from possessing, owning, caring for, etc, an animal, if they're subject to one of those orders, can file a petition for relief with the court, relief from that order so that they can get their rights to own, possess, care for, etc, back to them. And that's based on the, you may recall there's a prohibition about firearms forfeiture that exists in statute that also allows someone to file one of these petitions to get their rights restored. So it's just based on that process. And it was in the previous draft. There's just some technical changes I think primarily in response to some suggestions that Judge Zoni had made. So just to run through those real quick, you see line 11, page 13 providing the court with some discretion about whether to grant the petition or not. And in this particular case, subdivision two, this has to do with the situation where the parties agree or they've stipulated to it or there's no objection. So maybe that someone files a petition to have their rights restored. The state says fine, we'll stipulate to it or we're not going to object to it. This is just provided the court may grant a petition in that situation. Also in lines 15 to 16, the requirement, the court issue findings in an order in that situation that seems not really necessary if the parties have agreed. The factors that the court consider when they're hearing one of these petitions is line 19, just allowing the court to consider any relevant factors, including the ones that are listed over on the page 14. There's your list. Kind of comes back to line three. You'll see the similar issue we were talking about. Although this in this case, it was suggested by the judge that they successfully complete the animal cruelty prevention program. And I think that's actually modeled on some language elsewhere in the probation statute. Now we go into this is subdivision four line 14. This is the question of what does the court have to find in order to grant one of these petitions and the way it had been phrased previously. And again, this is this is a new this action is a newly created. It's modeled on the firearms petition, but it's newly created. So coming up with what standard the court would have to find had been met is something that the committee can think about and decide what they feel is best. The previous version said, depending on whether the petitioner could show that they were, this is line eight and nine, no longer likely to abuse an animal. That's basically it. No longer likely to abuse an animal in violation of those criminal statutes. That committee felt a little more flexibility and not necessarily tied to that. And also very difficult for the court to find something like that, tied to a concept that the court is familiar with, which is the interest of justice. So provide instead that the petitioner has to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the interest of justice are no longer served by prohibiting that person from owning, possessing, caring for an animal, etc. So it just provides some flexibility for the court to find, you know, justice, fundamental fairness, etcetera. Kind of come down on the side of no longer prohibiting the person from doing these things.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: So we just need to back up to C for a moment, Barbara. So

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: in order to be consistent, line four and five, one is, since it's not in the definition, successfully complete and approved animal cruelty program or approved by the director of animal welfare. So again, we're making sure that it's a real program that actually is intended to work. Then it probably should be and or obtain psychiatric, psychological or mental health counseling from a licensed clinician, from a clinician licensed to practice in Vermont.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yep, tracking that language. Right. Yep. Got it. Thank you. Nice catch.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: All right.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: All right. So moving on down through this, this proceeding, see this again, some, some edits to the petition process. So starting on line 12, the phrasing here is a little different under the previous version that if petition is granted. So in other words, if the court says we find that the interest of justice are no longer served, What does the court do in that situation instead of entering an order declaring that the person person is no longer prohibited, it just vacates the existing order. So a little bit more of a streamlined process, but same result, some technical making sure that it covers residing with etc. Further down Subdivision 6, not requiring the court to review the record de novo again, providing not being micromanaging the court, the Supreme Court handling of appeals too much. Same thing further down as well. You'll see that Subdivision 7, which goes over on the page 15. This is also conceptually similar. What happens if the court denies the petition, can the person just keep filing or is there going be some limitation on that? Again, this is based on the same concept as in that firearm statute that I mentioned. There is a limitation on successive petitions, they call that. You can't just keep filing them if they're denied. So the similar says it provides a two year, you can't bring one for another two years unless a shorter duration is authorized by the court. All right. So now we're moving into the civil forfeiture provisions. So we're out, we're past the criminal code. The current statute, the way it's written, and this is line six and seven. This is something that states attorney Brown mentioned to the committee that the current statute provides that the secretary of agriculture has to be consulted prior to an enforcement action, but there's been a Supreme Court decision, which I looked at that says that if you don't do that, that doesn't mean the action can be dismissed. It's not grounds for dismissal. So you'll see that new sentence on lines eleven and twelve, That's just modeled on the language in the Supreme Court decision. So it just tracks that language. Failure to conduct the consultation shall not be grounds for dismissal. A technical change in lines 15 to 16. It didn't really make sense to phrase that sentence in that way, because that's sort of an introductory sentence to, to when and when and how an animal may be seized. So we're just referring to the entirety of the subsection, which then continues on with voluntary surrender overrun for the next page, search and seizure, etcetera, all these different methods through which an animal can be seized. So, you remember the general thing going on here is the current forfeiture process, excuse me, is repealed and replaced with an attempt at a more streamlined and time sensitive forfeiture process that allows for money to be collected upfront rather than at the end through this posting of security process. So that starts over on page 18. Again, you'll see this a number of times that the number of days and many of these time limitations has changed from ten to fourteen to be consistent with the day is a day statute. Also, you remember the way this works is that the forfeiture happens by a humane officer, sorry, seizure, not forfeiture. They seize the animal. They then have now fourteen days, the person from whom the animal sees fourteen days to request a hearing. If they don't request a hearing during that time, and they then the animal can be forfeited. But they have the situation where the person wasn't present. So they weren't served with the notice. So you remember the idea there is in that case, the person does have to be served in the standard way that people are served. So if they're handed the notice, that's fine. That's when the fourteen day clock starts ticking. But if they're not there, then that fourteen day clock doesn't start ticking until they're actually served with the notice. And so that's the language you see added bottom of page 18 over onto top of page 19. If they weren't there, then that clock doesn't start ticking until they're served. That's all that says. Then you see in several places, ten days going to fourteen days Line 17 also just clarifying that it's fourteen days starting either after they are handed the notice or after they're served. Just trying to cover both of those instances.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Go ahead. I do have a question on Yeah. Page 18, line 21, and then going over to the next page. So I just wanna make sure, particularly on page 19 lines, human free, where service is effectuated. So if the person is provided the notice at the time of seizure, is that considered service? In other words, it's the fourteen days from the notice that they've received at the point of seizure or if the person was not there on service, unless of course it's considered service if at the time of the seizure, the individuals provided this information.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Well, that's a good point. And it may be that for purposes of just being consistent, you use the same sentence structure that you used on line 21 page 18. So you say fourteen day period child include the day on which the animal is seized or if the person was not present, the day on which service was made, you know, something like that. That makes sense?

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yes. Yeah. We'll see.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Alrighty. So now we're, so as I mentioned, the notice is handed to the person at the time the animal is seized. And then we're talking in this section, bottom of page 19 over on page 20. Well, what has to be in that notice that they hand them or if in the case of someone who's not there that served on them later on. And this adds what has to be in the statement that the security required by this section may be reduced or waived by the court on the basis of financial hardship. Remember, so that's already in the draft that you looked at. The person can request a waiver of the security based on financial hardship. And this is just providing that they know about it. So when the notice is handed out, then they know about it. And again, remember, that's a due process provision to make sure that this process satisfies potential due process challenge by providing for a hardship waiver if someone can show that in the court finds it. And again, that's included in the next subdivision E, the form there was already in the previous draft a form for a person to request the hearing and this says to include the financial hardship exemption as well. Moving on down to the hearing itself. So now we're outside of the form and now we're going to alright, so what about this hearing? See line seven court has to hold a forfeiture hearing if the request is made within fourteen days after the seizure, and that wouldn't be another place. Now that I look at it, that cause it's fourteen days after the seizure or service of the notice, right? Because it's going to be a depending on if there's a situation where the person wasn't there physically. Now you see that this thirty day period, and says lines ten and eleven, can be extended by the core for good cause shown. Now this is moved here from somewhere else because you may recall if you look, you want to look for a second on page 26, you'll see that the previous draft had included and this is on my version, page 26 lines five and six, that the court that any of these time limits in the entirety of this section can be extended by the court for good cause shown. I think the idea here is not to allow the court to extend all those time limits to just limit that to one, one instance, the court can extend that thirty day period for the final hearing, but the other ones are all as written, you know, fourteen days in most cases, I think there's a couple that are seven for purposes of appeal, but in any event, whatever they are, they're not going to be subject to this good cause extension. Would only be the thirty day period. So that language is struck on page 26 and just placed within this one particular place, the final thirty day hearing that permits extension. Bottom page 20, you'll see just, you'll see it again, and top of page 21 making the period 14 instead of 10. Now you'll see a highlighted sentence page 21 lines two and three. This is about this process of security and how does that work under there's no change to that sentence. Only highlighted it lines two and three because it was a decision point that the committee was thinking about, which was, you know, does the security get paid to the court and then sent to the animal welfare fund for distribution or does it get paid directly to the animal welfare fund? I think there was some discussion about that. Even though there's no change here just to indicate that this proposal goes with the approach of having the court collect the security rather than the animal welfare fund. Then it's the court that sends it to the fund for distribution. So that's the way the process would work in this draft. And speaking of the security, look at page lines seven through nine, also on page 21. Well, what if the defendant doesn't pay? I think the thought here is, well, that's relevant to whether or not the court or the defendant has the ability to care for this animal and whether or not they've cared for the animal in the past. So this specifically allows the court to consider the defendant whether or not the defendant paid that security as a relevant factor when determining whether the animal was subject to neglect. Again, you'll see a change on line 11 instead of the five court shall make findings of fact and issue conclusions of law within five business days is the current or was the phrase in the previous draft. I think in response to some testimony from the court that was changed to promptly. So this is after the hearing is held, and which has to be done within thirty days unless extended by good cause shown, then they have to issue their final order within five days afterward. You see another change lines fourteen fifteen. Let's say the state meets its burden of proof. In other words, court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the animal was subject to abuse, then the court has to order immediate forfeiture of the animal. That's line 14. And then an addition and any offspring of the animal that was born, I just, as I read it out loud, that made me grammatically wonder whether that should be were or was, but I guess I'll maybe it's correct. I don't know. Didn't sound quite right, but I'll defer that question. And any offspring of the animal that was born while the animal was in custody. So if the animal happens to give birth while in custody, then those offspring would be forfeited as well.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Should be whirring. What's that? Literally, where is the plural. So you're correct that your your instinct is correct, Eric.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Thank you. Over on the page 22. You see that just to change actually that line 15, that's just going back to the bill as introduced. That was a change that got lost somehow. But so it's insert putting that back in. Which makes sense. It's the courts allowing testimony by telephone under when the statute was enacted. That was probably the only way you could do it remotely. But as we know nowadays, there are other methods for testifying remotely. That just updates that language. That's provision that that refers to on page 22 is also related to the next change on page 23 having to do with the rules of evidence. So that what we just looked at allows for remote testimony, allows for affidavits to be submitted and considered by the court, that sort of thing. So that's consistent with subdivision F page 23, which instead of saying that the rules of evidence apply with any reference to hearsay, it's just saying rules of evidence apply unless otherwise provided by this section. And so that will rope in like the hearsay testimony gets permitted by affidavit and those other types of considering testimony by the court that are permitted in the statute. So if it does, if it's not permitted, then the rules of evidence apply. Making these time limits consistent again, line 11, you see there's a when does the payment of costs that's required by the person who who had their animals forfeited, they have to pay within not 15, but 14, just to make use of the same same numbers. Then we're using these multiples of seven you'll over you'll see over on page 25. This is about the appeal to the Supreme Court line six instead of within five days within seven. Also further down on page 25, similar thing, there's no change to lines fifteen and sixteen. I was just highlighting it to the same issue of the security being posted with the court rather than the animal welfare fund. That language on subdivision three is struck. That's, the idea not to micromanage how the Supreme Court is handling its docket on appeals. Over on to page 26, I think we've already talked about the first parts of this lines five through eight, that, you know, that time limit language is struck, because it doesn't those those extensions for good cause shown only apply to that thirty day hearing, which we just saw. Does keep the security language line seven to eight, this financial hardship, the the due process procedure, and the new language though on lines nine to 13, this is for immunity. Remember this has been talked about in this immunity language that you see there in subsection K is based on language that is in statute for law enforcement officers during seizure of firearms, as well as the existing immunity for animal shelters and rescues that you have elsewhere in this chapter. So sort of emerging of those two statutes, basically providing the humane officer or animal shelter or rescue organization shall be immune from civil or criminal liability for seizing or providing care or treatment to an animal. And this is stock language we use in immunity context. If they've done all that in good faith reliance on the provisions of this section, in other words, they're relying in good faith on the provisions of the law, then they're going to be immune from any civil or criminal liability for any actions that they took. Also standard language lines twelve and thirteen, they don't have immunity for gross negligence or intentional misconduct. And that's often, or if not virtually always the way these immunity provisions work. So providing that there as well.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Angela has a question.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Eric, I missed you back on page 25.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yeah.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Sixteen and seventeen, the court shall collect and transpose the security. Are we gonna try to find a way to take the court out of that?

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Yeah, so that's something that's why it's highlighted because it's still an open question.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Okay.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: I've given some input that was received. Okay. At least my last thought.

[Rep. Angela Arsenault (Member)]: Thank you.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Sure. So back to page 26, line 14. Now this for the next few pages, this to remember is the cost of care action. And this is the separate type of action that this that the bill has introduced had created that is distinct from the forfeiture provision but it allows the custodial caregiver themselves as opposed to the state because it's the state, the state's attorney that's bringing the forfeiture case, right? So if they're also looking for the deposit of security, that's, you know, the idea of that security is to offset some of the costs of care. So in a way they're trying to get at the same, I think issue, which is these accumulating costs of care when an animal is seized. How does that get paid for particularly for these custodial caregivers that are accumulating these costs? So that was one option. The one that we just have finished up now the bond or sorry, the security submitted during the forfeiture proceeding. And this was a different option that the custodial caregiver or the state could file a lawsuit themselves called the cost of care action to try and get reimbursed for the cost of care that were running up while the animal was in custody. And so the question I think that the policy question for the committee is and continues to be, do you have both of those proceedings in this bill or do you have one or the other? And the proposal right now or at least one sort of struck as the what to think about is this draft proposes to strike the cost of care action and just go with the expedited proceeding in the forfeiture seizure proceeding and its submission of financial security there to try and offset the cost. But that's a policy decision for the committee to think about whether or not you want one or the other of both. The purposes of this draft, you'll see, that takes us all the way, we're pretty much done now, all the way up to page 30, but that's just the cost of care act and being struck in this version. And then the last two sections of the bill have to do with what you were just mentioning representative Arsenault, which is, you know, how are you going to handle the management of security funds submitted the way the draft currently is. And there are no language changes here between this draft and the previous one. It's just highlighted for discussion purposes, but the way it's written now, it's still premised on this idea that the owner of the animal submits the security to the court and then the court transfers it to the Animal Welfare Fund for purposes of distribution to the custodial care organizations or whoever it is that has run up the costs and is entitled to reimbursement. So that's the structure that you look at as well as the rulemaking part of it in lines 10 through 17 on page 30, which is if you're going to have this process, it provides the Division of Animal Welfare with the authority to adopt rules to govern how that process would work.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Next question?

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Eric, can you remind us how we arrived at 67% on line six on page 31?

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: I'm sorry, I don't. That's an existing law. So it would have been passed in 2023. So I can look into that for you, but I don't know off the top of my head.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: So do we know where the rest of it goes?

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: I'm sure that's in statute as well. I'll it up and get back to you.

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: I I just wondered if.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: Yeah, I'll follow-up with you on that, Representative Rachelson.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Thank you.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: You bet.

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: And that brings us to the end. I think that's pretty much it as far as the walkthrough of the proposed amendment.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Alright. Thanks very much. So we need to take a quick break now or get started on the next witness and take a break at 10:15. What's

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Is that witness gonna be done at 10:15?

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: No, but we can have her start and then come back. Oh, sure. What would you like? Okay.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Go for it. Try it. Let's see how you do.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Take some long and get started. Maybe she's just gonna say, oh, this is

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: all That'll

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: be way longer than fifteen minutes. Not necessarily.

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: Oh, it's like you've met me before.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Okay. This isn't my first rodeo.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: No pun intended.

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: I'm Lisa Mylett. I'm the director of animal welfare in the Department of Public Safety for the state of Vermont, and thank you very much for having me here today and for all of the work you're putting into this bill. I know that you're grappling with a lot of really hard issues, and you're trying to balance various rights and various demands. And so I appreciate the time you're putting in, and it feels like you are we're getting closer to something that perhaps will work for the animal shelters and rescue organizations that currently take on a lot of the burden from animal cruelty cases, as well as what's going to work for the populace of Vermont more generally. As before, no recommendation on this bill yet, because DPS does not take a stand until bills make it to the House floor and they've had a chance to until it makes it to the legislative floor, and they've had a chance to review it all. But I do have some comments and thoughts, and I have been reaching out to animal shelters and rescue organizations just to see what their feedback is as we go along in this process. So the first thing I'd like to comment on, though, is on page 10, lines three through five, which talks about the Animal Abuse Education Accountability Program. I would suggest changing that to successfully complete an Animal Abuse Education Accountability Program, comma, if any, is approved by the Director of Animal Welfare. I actually don't know of anything equivalent to the accountability courts and the accountability programs we have in other areas. And that's something I'm happy to look into, and I'm happy to even, at some point, think about building, but I don't want the courts to think this thing is out there, and so I will sentence it without them talking to me first. So that's just a flag on that point. There are definitely animal cruelty prevention programs. And so I'm less concerned about that one, it's the accountability program, which could be really beneficial, but I don't know that we have one. So the remainder of my comments are about Section three fifty four, the searches, seizures, the forfeiture, the primary provision that a lot of this action is going on. And so on page 16, lines eight through 10, there's a requirement that a veterinarian licensed to practice in Vermont accompany the humane officer during execution of the search warrant. And I flagged that as a potential barrier previously to actually being able to execute a search warrant. And so the suggestion was to change that to shall, if practical, accompany the humane officer in the execution of the search warrant. And I'm a little concerned that that makes it more ambiguous because what does that mean? How many vets do you need to call if you have no budget? What does that mean? And so what I would suggest is just as with the agency of agriculture, the Secretary of Agriculture's requirement to weigh in on a case, there being a Supreme Court case saying, Hey, that doesn't damage the case if that doesn't happen. There actually is a state Supreme Court case in Vermont saying that if the veterinarian is not on scene for the seizure, it does not affect the case. It does not affect the the evidences, and it doesn't affect whether the case can proceed. So I would recommend language very similar to what you drafted on page 15, lines 11 through 12, or line sixteen, eight through nine, and just say failure to have a veterinarian shall not be grounds for dismissal working enforcement action or suppression of any evidence based on, I think it's state v. Shepherd, but I'm happy to send along that case site to Eric so that he can see that. But I think that would make it very clear, make it clear there's a barrier, but also not introduce ambiguity that is not there. All right, so then the primary part of this is talking about how do we work through a process for forfeiting title to an animal that's been seized? While And trying to balance the need to do this quickly, because animals, unlike other forms of property, need to be fed, they need to be housed, they need to be cared for during this time after they're seized and before it's determined whether they'll go back to the owner or have pegylforbidden be disposed of another way. And on its face, this sets forth an expedited process because there's a fifteen day period that if the owner does not ask fourteen day period, where if the owner does not ask for a hearing and did not put in a security towards the costs of care, title is forfeited. And then there's a thirty day period if they do ask for the hearing, where the hearing is supposed to occur. So it looks like this will all be resolved within forty five days in almost all cases. Unfortunately, that's not really the way this is going to play out. If there's no security required because it can be waived, that fifteen day period is almost never going to resolve the issue. And then we've got that fifteen day period doesn't start running until notice is services effectuated under rule four of the rules of civil procedure. The rules of civil procedure are used in civil cases, cases where there's an attorney representing a plaintiff and suing someone else. And those are rarely really time sensitive cases. It might be my car was stolen and I want to sue the other person and get the car back or get the value back. And so while I need a car, nothing's

[Eric Fitzpatrick (Legislative Counsel, Vermont General Assembly)]: going

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: to die if that car is not cared for in the interim. And so the rules of civil procedure, I've told them, rule four, what it requires is if an owner is not present on the property when the animal is seized, it would require that the state's attorney who is dealing with murder cases, who is dealing with rape cases, who is dealing with assault cases, focus on getting service to this person who might not be findable. It requires going to their house and personally serving them, or serving an adult in the house if you've tried several times and you can't serve that person. What do you do with someone who's unhoused? What do you do with the person who was evicted from an apartment, leaving an animal behind? We don't know where they are. Keep trying to serve, the state's attorney puts aside the other cases, keeps trying to have this served, and eventually they go to the court and say, let's have a hearing about this and what I can do. That still presumes there's a house to go to and effect service at. Rescues have told me that when this provision has been used before to try and serve for them, it's taken six months or more to affect service. So there is a bomb in the middle of this forty five day time period that could be a day, It could be six months. You don't know. And that's a really long time. And so the rescues and shelters have told me that if that's what's in there, if that's the way service has to be done, we aren't taking the animals unless the owner's on the property when they're seized. And law enforcement will tell you if the owner's on the property when the animals are seized, that's when they're at a high risk of violence. And so law enforcement doesn't wanna seize when the owners are there if they can avoid it. Rescues and shelters can't help under this approach if the owner's not present. So you've set up this tension where on its face, it looks like this is moving it ahead. I understand that. I understand what you're grappling with, but other states have grappled with it and come up with other solutions that moved it along much more quickly. So I'm not sure that this gets you to where you need to be to have rescues and shelters able to take on housing animals that are seized from the case. So

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: since this is a civil process, aren't there other ways to get disturbed?

[Rep. Barbara Rachelson (Member)]: Sure.

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: So for example, while posting is not usually used for service of process in civil cases, because you've got time to find the person, so that is the better way to do it. With an animal, an owner should be feeding their animal every day, right? An owner should be providing water for their animal several times a day. If they're not showing back up on that property where they would see a posted notice within twenty four hours, then they're committing cruelty anyway. And so unlike a car where I can park my car and I cause no harm by leaving it parked for a year, so if you put something on my windshield, I might not know it's there. With an animal, the difference is if you post it where the animal was, the owner is either showing back up to care for their animal where they see the notice, or they're not feeding and watering their animal anyway. And that's a real problem. And so that's the difference between the animal and a typical civil case, is that whereas posting might not be a great second choice, first choice is somebody who's physically present, second choice would be posting like the Minnesota law, it's normally not a great second choice in a civil case. It might be where you're talking about a life that needs to be fed and provided water and provided shelter, and the owner's clearly not doing those things if they're not showing up to even check-in on their animal. And this is one of the things we have, is people who house the animals on a property they don't live at. And they show up sometimes to care for them. And over time that becomes cruelty. So this is when you're seizing an animal from that instance, who might not even know where that owner lives. It might be their cousin's wife owns the property the animals are on. And so how do you get the cousin's wife to tell you where the person is? Get a court order. Once again, there's a whole timing element here that is not present in other civil cases because of the time pressures we're carrying for an animal.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Except that it's not the care I mean, the animal is presumably being cared with. It's a matter of whether there's the funds, and I understand it's very important for whoever's providing the care because the animal's been seized. So it's not that unless the human society, whatever entity is caring for the animal decides not to feed the animal care for it. It's the cost of that care that we're talking about. I just

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: want to It's about, no, it's not just that because the Humane Society will say upfront, I will not assist in this seizure if there is this time bomb in the middle of the timeframe. And so they will not take the animal in the first case. And what I've seen from law enforcement officers is that vets offices are getting burned. They don't want those animals there for months, and nobody has the money to pay for it. But even if they're paid for, it's committing a further form of victimization to simply house these animals in an enclosed It's isolation. It's like putting a prisoner in isolation for months while you wait it out. It's mentally really bad for the animals. So the human societies and rescue and actually vet's offices, are saying, No, I won't help you by housing this animal unless the animal can be disposed of quickly. And so that's the problem, in the first instance, that animal's not getting seized, so they're being left on that property.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: And also, if it's posted, if there's a seizure, the person's not there, and they post it, we don't know when they may have seen that posted. That fourteen days, they may not see until after the fourteen days. Is that a due process problem?

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: I don't believe so. That's up to your counsel, but Minnesota once again has had their statute in place since 2000. There was a due process suit in their previous version of the statute because there was no process. There was no allowance for hearing at all. There was notice, no allowance for hearing in the statute due process lawsuit that got struck down. They brought the new statute forward in 2000. It has been in place for twenty five years, and it provides for posting if the owner is not president. And so there has not been a successful due process challenge in twenty five years.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: President, has there been any due process challenge?

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: I didn't see any evidence of that. I looked at the case law for the section. I didn't see any, but I could have missed it.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: No, that's fine. Ken, this question didn't bother me.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: So going back to what you said, we're dealing with animals, with loved ones, and this is going to be a highly, highly emotional thing because pets, the ones that we love and everything.

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: What a livestock, people get emotional about their, it's not just pigs.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: Big time, big time, because they're pets too, right? So, we're going into an area that we've known about, but we've never gone to this level that we're looking at now, that is way past due. We've relied on a lot of veterinarians doing their free time, going way above and beyond neighbors and all this stuff. And we're setting up a bigger situation that somehow or another we need to protect people that is trying to do the the right thing. The other thing I wanna bring into this, I don't even think we've talked about is the town local officials with the animal control, correct? Which they're gonna be brought into this even more, right? And then when you're dealing with your local shelters with the smaller animals and stuff like that, that's much easier to handle than the bigger livestock horses, stuff like that, right?

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: Not necessarily. With the livestock, what I've seen is that another farmer might step in to say, I can care for these four cows that have been starved. I can take care of them because I can ultimately integrate them into my herd and they'll be part of the food chain in that way. And that happens with livestock, or there's a sanctuary that might be able to help by taking the animals in, and they don't house animals in kennels and cages the way dogs and cats get housed at a humane society or rescue, because that's the sort of space there is for these animals. So, it's actually they're all complicated in their own ways, offensive But in their own

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: to my point, we're gonna have, I believe that this is coming to light, and it's coming to light very, very fast, and we're gonna have more of this. We have less farms, we have less places to go and do all this housing and stuff, and one of my big concerns amongst a lot of those, and you know, I'm a strong supporter of this, is we don't have enough people to follow-up on this job that needs to be done to do the protection of everybody involved, whether it's the animals or the humans or anything. And hopefully, your expertise is going to lead us down that right path. Again, we've got to have consequences and make sure they're followed to make this happen. Otherwise, we're just kicking the can down the road.

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: We can't do that. All the research shows that the way to effectively prevent animal cruelty and prevent recidivism is to have escalating penalties, so seizing animals, forfeiting title, prohibiting ownership of animals, fines, and actually prosecute people and hold them to the law. The education programs are great. There's not a whole lot of evidence that that's going to prevent later recidivism, especially once you get to the point of cruelty. What everything shows is taking away the opportunity for people to commit these crimes again by not having them in close proximity to animals, by having them have their animals forfeited, by having to pay the care to rehabilitate animals they injured, those things are what prevent cruelty based on the empirical research that's been done. And so you're right, in that if the people who are committing these crimes because nobody is seizing animals because they missed one meal. Nobody is seizing them because their owner, by the time they get to the end of the month, doesn't really have the cash for high quality dog and cat food, and so they're feeding them leftover scraps. Nobody's seizing them for those reasons. The animals that are being seized are being housed in uninsulated outdoor kennels in minus 15 degree weather with no bedding, for example, for short haired dogs. They are being starved for weeks on end. They're being put on a chain where they can't get away from hazards and just left there alone. These animals are not borderline cases. The police, local law enforcement, VSP, Fish and Wildlife, they do not have time. Even a deal with the one dog in the backyard that is barking regularly, doesn't get fed every day, but is okay body condition. That's not the animal that they have time to deal with. They're dealing with cases where there is long term severe neglect, where there is blunt force trauma, where there is sexual abuse, where there is horses being housed in pastures, there is no dry space, so their feet are rotting. These are really severe cases. And so to the extent we say that these animals have to be held further just in suspended states, and we expect private entities to take care of the care and the housing and the money, it's just breaking down. Other states have public sources of funding for housing these animals. They provide public shelters. Delaware contracts with private shelters. They pay money and they pay a couple million a year for this. Vermont does not do those things. Vermont relies on private organizations who have no obligation to help with this. And if they say no, Vermont doesn't have public shelters. And so this is why I think you need to really think about what the shelters and rescue organizations are saying they need, and the number one thing they're saying they need is for these things to move through quickly. Because they do not have capacity. A lot of the shelters in Vermont have four dog kennels. So if there's a 12 dog seizure, you're tying up all of the kennels in several of Vermont's 12 shelters, for months. And so I'm not trying to be You're going to hear from one of the animal shelter directors after your break. I think that you've already heard from some rescue groups, I'm not sure. But this is why I'm saying that the animal situation is somewhat different than the traditional civil case, which is ultimately about money usually. This is about who actually cares for these animals, and is there anyone to do that, or do they get left where they are until they die?

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: So on those same lines, what I'm bringing up is we have this same problem with humans, with lack of people that are taking care of them, DCF, whatever program you wanna say, we don't have enough people or enough resources or anything to go and take care of this existing thing. We're going to, we need to do something with the animal cruelty, no question about it. I just, somehow or another, we need to figure out how to do this, and with your expertise from other states, getting it done properly. I mean, what have we been? We've been what? Three weeks of really, really cold weather, and I think we're about to head into another week of below averages. And by the way, the crops between the floods that we've had the last couple of years, and then the drop last year, I mean, have you have your work cut out for us. I'm just gonna stand behind you whenever I possibly can, but it's there's a lot of work to this. We have to pass the bill, no question about it. We have to make it as fine tuned as we possibly can and cover all the areas, but this is not a cut and dry, easy thing to attain and follow-up with. And like the agency of agriculture, I mean, they've got their hands full already. And don't forget, there's not like a lot of mom and pop farms anymore or anything, like most of our farms, they're factories. So yeah, they're gonna bring in certain animals and stuff like that, hopefully to help offset the costs or something, but.

[Lisa Mylett (Director of Animal Welfare, Vermont Department of Public Safety)]: I can say that from my experience and talking to the folks in the livestock side of things, most of the issues are not with those large farms. So the operating farms are not where the problems are coming from. It's the person with a couple of horses or who breeds horses.

[Rep. Kenneth Goslant (Clerk)]: I'm not saying the large farm, I'm saying- Like absorb the animals. Yes, because we don't have the small mom and pop farms that we used to where people were milking thirty, forty cows or something like that. Those days are long past us. Yeah.

[Rep. Martin LaLonde (Chair)]: Thank you. So we're gonna take a break until twenty and five then we'll have Lisa back because I know for Lisa, Barbara and Thomas,