Vermont Legislature SmartTranscripts:

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Will the house please come to order and members kindly take their seats? Good afternoon. In lieu of a devotional today, will you please join me in a moment of silence? Members, we have 18 house bills for introduction today. With that member from Pultely, can you please offer us a motion to suspend our rules to introduce bills by number only?

[Representative Patricia McCoy]: Madam speaker, I make a motion to suspend rules in order to introduce bills by number only.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Member from Pulte moves that we suspend our rules to introduce bills by number only. Are you ready for the question?

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: If

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: so, all those in favor, please say aye. Aye. All those opposed, please say nay. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes do have it and you have suspended rules to introduce bills by number only. Please listen to the first reading of bills by number only.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To general and housing.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy one.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To commerce and economic development.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy two.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To judiciary.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy three.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To judiciary.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy four.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To general and housing.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy five.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To judiciary.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy six.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To judiciary.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy seven.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To commerce and economic development.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy eight.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To ways and means.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight seventy nine.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To environment.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight eighty.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To judiciary.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eighty eight eighty one.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To government operations and military affairs.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight eighty two.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To environment.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight eighty three.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To environment.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight eighty four.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To government operations and military affairs.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight eighty five.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To human services.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H eight eighty six.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To Ways and Means.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: And H887.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: To General and Housing. Members we have a bill on the notice calendar requiring referral to a money committee pursuant to House Rule 35A. House bill six forty seven is an act relating to the creation of the Vermont sister state program. Carrying an appropriation the bill is referred to the committee on appropriations. Members, we have four resolutions to take up at this time. The first is a house resolution for introduction. H HR 13 is a house resolution relating to the end of apartheid and support for the people of Palestine and Israel in the resolution of conflict offered by representative Gina of Burlington and others. Please listen to the resolution by title only.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: HR 13, house resolution relating to the end of apartheid and support the people of Palestine and Israel and the resolution of conflict.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Now the resolution has been read for the first time and the same is treated as a bill and referred to the committee on government operations and military affairs pursuant to house rule 52. We also have a joint house resolution for introduction. JRH eight is a joint resolution condemning the 01/03/2026 US military incursion in Venezuela and imploring that Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and his wife Celia Flores be released from US custody and that all US military forces recently deployed in the Caribbean Sea and the Eastern Pacific Ocean be withdrawn immediately. That Venezuelans be allowed to exercise their right to self, to political self determination on their own accord and that The United States abandon any intentions or plans to repeat the same, to repeat a similar intervention to disrupt or destroy the right to self determination and political sovereignty of any other nation offered by representative Cole of Hartford and others. Please listen to the reading of the resolution by title only.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: JRH eight, joint resolution condemning the 01/03/2026 US military incursion in Venezuela and imploring that Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Celia Flores, be released from US custody, that all US military forces recently been deployed in the Caribbean Sea and the Eastern Pacific Ocean be withdrawn immediately, that Venezuelans be allowed to exercise their right to political self determination on their own accord, and that The United States abandon any intentions or plans to repeat a similar intervention to disrupt or destroy the right to self determination and political sovereignty of any other nation.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Now the this resolution has been read for the first time and the same is treated as a bill and referred to the committee on government operations and military affairs pursuant to House Rule 52. Now we have a joint senate resolution to take up. JRS 37 is a joint resolution supporting in solidarity with national and international ski organizations and numerous skiers across the globe. The introduction of a long overdue gender equality in Nordic combined Olympic competition and urging that the international Olympic committee only introduce new Olympic sports that practice gender equality. It was offered by senators Mollie and Bartholomew was adopted on the part of the senate. Please listen to the reading of the resolution by title only.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: JRS 37, joint resolution supporting and solidarity with national and international ski organizations and numerous skiers across the globe. The introduction of long overdue gender equality in Nordic combined Olympic competition and urging that the International Olympic Committee only introduce new Olympic sports that practice gender equality.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Now this resolution has been read for the first time and the same is treated as a bill and referred to the committee on commerce and economic development pursuant to house rule 52. And finally JRS 39 is a joint resolution relating to weekend adjournment on 02/06/2026. It was offered by Senator Bartholomew was read and adopted on the part of the senate. Please listen to the reading of the resolution.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: Resolved by the senate and house of representatives that when the two houses adjourn on Friday, 02/06/2026, it be to meet again no later than Tuesday, 02/10/2026.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Now you've heard the reading of the resolution and the question is shall the house adopt the resolution in concurrence? Are you ready for the question? If so, all those in favor please say aye. Aye. All those opposed please say nay. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes do have it and the resolution is adopted in concurrence. Are there any announcements? Member from Fair Fairfax.

[Representative Ashley Bartley]: Thank you, madam speaker. As many of you know, tomorrow is outdoor recreation day. The caucus for Vermont's economy will be hosting an outdoor recreation business listening session. It's going to be at 8AM in Room 11. This will be what we are hopeful of being one of many business listening sessions, so would love to just invite you all to come listen, hopefully ask some questions, and just connect with constituents.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Member from Shaftsbury.

[Representative David Durfee]: Madam speaker, it's Wednesday, which means tonight is farmers' night. And tonight's program is a little bit different. It's not music. The title is stories from the woods. It's a curated story hour featuring six different stories. It's gonna be hosted jointly by the department of forest parks and recreation and the department of fish and wildlife. Please join us at 07:30.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Are there any further announcements? Member from Brattleboro.

[Representative Emilie Kornheiser]: Thank you, madam speaker. The Climate Solutions Caucus will meet tomorrow at noon in Room 10. We will have pizza. We have a very exciting program tomorrow. The esteemed Pew Charitable Trust members will be here to bring staff members who have traveled to share their expertise expertise on issues related to infrastructure financing and deferred maintenance. They have a tailored presentation on disaster and climate budgeting principles that will also cover issues relating to public infrastructure. Hope you can join us for this important conversation. Thank you.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Are there any further announcements? Member from Wakesfield.

[Representative Kari Dolan]: Thank you, madam speaker. Tomorrow at 04:30 in Room 11, we will be hosting an education reform discussion. This is for all members of the body and really intended to bring members who are not in ways and means and education kind of up to speed on the conversations regarding education reform. And this is intended to be the first in a series of meetings. We will keep it to one hour. It's in Room 11. Everyone is welcome.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Are there any further announcements? Seeing none. Orders of the day. Members, we will begin with house bill five forty one which is an act relating to interference with voters and election officials. Please listen to the third reading of the bill.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H five forty one, an act relating to interference with voters and election officials.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The question is, shall the bill pass? Are you ready for the question? If so, all those in favor, please say aye. Aye. All those opposed please say nay. The ayes that appear to have it, the ayes do have it and you have passed the bill. Up next is House Bill five which is an act relating to a hearsay exemption for a child under 16 years of age. The bill was referred to the committee on judiciary which recommends that the bill be amended as printed in today's calendar. The member from Essex Junction, Representative Dolan will speak for the committee. Please listen to the second reading of the bill.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: H five, an act relating to a hearsay exception for a child under 16 years of age.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Member from Essex Junction.

[Representative Karen Dolan]: Madam speaker, h five, as amended by the house judiciary committee, extends Vermont's existing hearsay exception to include children who are 13 to 15 years of age when the child is a putative victim of abuse or sexual assault. Under current law, this age specific exception applies only to children aged 12 and under. It is important to note that h five does not create a new hearsay exception. Rather, it expands the age eligibility of an existing evidentiary rule that already applies in limited proceedings and under strict judicial oversight in Vermont. The purpose of the bill is to ensure courts may consider reliable out of court statements in cases involving adolescent adolescent victims of abuse, recognizing well documented developmental and evidentiary challenges in these cases. At the same time, the bill preserves constitutional protections for defendants and longstanding safeguards within the rules of evidence. By extending the existing hearsay exception to children ages 13 to 15, h five aligns Vermont law with decades of child development and brain science. While adolescents in this age group may appear more mature, research shows they remain developmentally vulnerable, particularly when navigating trauma, abuse, and power imbalances with adults. Requiring these youth to engage fully in legal processes designed primarily for adults without appropriate statutory accommodation can risk further harm and undermine the pursuit of justice. H five provides that accommodation while protecting the rights of defendants through requiring rigorous judicial findings before any out of court statement may be admitted. I will now briefly review the bill as amended by house judiciary. Members may find h five as introduced on the house judiciary web page with the commit committee amendment reflected on page three five seven of today's calendar. The bill contains two sections. Section one amends rule eight zero four a of the Vermont rules of evidence to apply to children 16 years of age rather than limiting the rule to children aged 12 and under. This section also reaffirms that the hearsay exception applies only in narrow and specified circumstances, including civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings in which the child is a putative victim of sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault, lewd or lascivious conduct, incest, abuse, neglect, or exploitation, and cruelty to a child involving serious bodily injury. The next allowable circumstance is juvenile delinquency proceedings involving acts that would constitute these offenses if committed by an adult. And the final exception applies in child in need of care or supervision, CHIN's proceedings involving allegations of sexual abuse. Section one also preserves critical judicial safeguards. Before admitting statements under the hearsay exception, the court must specifically find that the statements relate directly to the alleged offense or abuse, the statements were not taken in preparation for litigation, and in criminal or delinquency cases were made prior to the defendant's initial court appearance. The child or covered individual is available to testify in court or pursuant to rule eight zero seven. And lastly, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statements are deemed trustworthy. Section two sets the effective date. The committee's sole amendment to the bill changes the effective date to 07/01/2026. During committee, we heard testimony from a broad range of stakeholders, including representatives from the Office of Legislative Counsel, the Vermont judiciary, the attorney general's office, the defender general's office, the Department for Children and Families, victim advocacy organizations, law enforcement, and legal service providers. This testimony informed the committee's careful consideration of both child protection and due process concerns. Madam speaker, h five reflects a thoughtful and balanced approach to supporting adolescent victims of sexual abuse while maintaining essential procedural protections. The bill was reported favorably out of house judiciary on a vote of ten zero one, and the committee respectfully asked the house to join us in supporting its passage.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The question is, shall the bill be amended as recommended by the committee on judiciary? Are you ready for the question? If so, all those in favor, please say aye. Aye. All those opposed, please say nay. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes do have it and you have amended the bill. Now the question is shall the bill be read a third time? Are you ready for that question? If so, all those in favor, please say aye. Aye. All those opposed, please say nay. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes do have it and third reading is ordered. Members the final bill on our action calendar today is house bill six twenty six which is an act relating to voyeurism and disclosure of sexually explicit images without consent. The bill was referred to the committee on judiciary which recommends that the bill be amended as printed in today's calendar. The member from Pittsburgh, representative will speak for the committee. Please listen to the second reading of the bill.

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: Age six two six, an act relating to voyeurism and disclosure of sexually explicit images without consent.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Member from Pittsburgh.

[Representative Michael "Mike" Southworth]: Madam speaker, h six twenty six strengthens our state's criminal and civil responses to image based abuse. The strike all amendment can be found on page three fifty seven of today's house calendar. Image based abuse includes the creation, distribution or threat to share explicit images of a person without their consent. This type of abuse has become increasingly common with advances in and access to technology. And as we know, once an image is shared online, it can spread instantly and be nearly impossible to remove. Consequences of this type of abuse are wide ranging, impacting survivors' safety, reputation, relationships, job prospects, and physical and mental health. Tragically, image based abuse disproportionately affects young people and can shape the rest of their lives. As technology advances, it is essential that our laws be updated to protect Vermonters in this new reality. Age six twenty six addresses three forms of this abuse: video voyeurism, are images or recordings taken without a person's knowledge or consent in a private setting such as a hidden camera in a restroom nonconsensual disclosure of explicit images, which are images that may or may not have been originally obtained with permission are later shared without permission. Vermont's statute on nonconsensual disclosure encompasses what is often called revenge porn as well as digitally altered or AI generated explicit images. Sextortion, a form of sexual exploitation in which a perpetrator threatens to disclose a real or synthetic image unless a victim complies with demands. This can occur in the context of domestic violence, trafficking or online scams. The bill strengthens remedies in criminal and civil court for victims of video voyeurism. For the criminal remedies, the bill creates a separate subsection on voyeurism, including images or recordings. This allows video voyeurism crimes to have a different statute of limitations, which we'll discuss more later in this bill. For civil remedies, age six twenty six allows a harmed victim to file a lawsuit against a perpetrator who displays or discloses an image of voyeurism, and they may do so at any time, meaning there is no statute of limitations. The bill allows victims of nonconsensual disclosure of explicit images to have access to the same civil remedies as victims of voyeurism. The bill also clarifies that a diagnosis of a trauma related disorder such as PTSD meets the requirement of actual injury in a civil claim filed by a victim of voyeurism. This provision is informed by a 2025 Vermont Supreme Court decision, Kilborn v. Simmons, involving harm caused by video voyeurism. In a concurring majority opinion, two justices emphasized that Vermont tort law has not kept pace with our understanding of PTSD and psychological trauma. They urge the development of this area of tort law to bring us closer to parity, ensuring that those harmed psychologically as well as physically are heard and compensated. I'll now go through the first two sections of the bill before yielding to the member from Williston to cover the other three sections. Section one pertains to voyeurism. Subsection adds a definition of harm. This is needed because the term is used in subsection K. Subsection rearranges the statute to separate unlawful intentional viewing from unlawful intentional photographing, filming, or recording for purposes of extending the statute of limitations for photographing, filming, or recording in Section four. Substantively, the offenses in this section remain the same and amendments are technical. Subsection K establishes a private right of action against a defendant who intentionally displays or discloses to a third party an image recorded in violation of the statute and the display or disclosure causes the plaintiff harm. Subdivision K-three allows a plaintiff to recover damages for disorder resulting from trauma in a negligence claim under this statute. Currently, case law limits recovery for emotional harm in such actions. Subdivision K-four permits retroactive application of the statute of limitations for bringing an action under subsection K. Section two, Disclosure of sexually explicit materials without consent. Removes the words threaten or coerce because the committee created a new crime of sexual extortion in section three of the bill. Subdivision B2 just moves the language from B1 to B2. And subsection E, subdivisions three and four, mirrors the language in subsection 2,605 regarding recovery for disorder resulting from trauma in a negligence claim and applies a statute of limitations retroactively. I'll now yield to the member from Williston.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The member from Pittsburgh yields to the member from Williston.

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: Picking up at section three. Section three establishes the crime of sexual extortion, also called sextortion, using definitions that are already used elsewhere in statute. Subsection b prohibits a person from knowingly threatening to disclose a visual image of an identifiable person who is nude or engaged in sexual conduct without that person's consent and with the intent to compel the person to engage in conduct against that person's will or to refrain from engaging in any conduct in which the person has a legal right to engage. Subsection c prohibits a person from knowingly threatening another person with the intent to compel that person to produce nude visual images, images of sexual conduct, or to engage in sexual conduct. Subsection d establishes the following penalties for a violation of the statute. A three year felony if the victim of the offense is 18 years of age or older. This is the same penalty as Vermont's extortion statute. A ten year felony if the victim of the offense is under 18 years of age, a fifteen year felony if serious bodily injury or death results from a violation of the statute. Subsections

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: e

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: and f provide limited immunity from prosecution for violating laws related to disseminating indecent material for a person who reports to law enforcement that they are a victim of sexual extortion. We heard testimony that this may help encourage victims to report without fear of getting into trouble for sending the nude images in the first place. Section four addresses the criminal statute of limitations. H six twenty six extends the statute of limitations for voyeurism involving photographing, filming, or recording, voyeurism involving disclosure of those recordings or images, disclosure of sexually explicit images without consent, and sextortion to forty years after the commission of the crime. This shift aligns with how crimes involving sexually explicit images actually unfold and provides victims with the option to pursue justice in criminal court. Section five contains the effective date, 07/01/2026, and a note that the bill will be retitled to an act relating to sexual extortion, voyeurism, and disclosure of sexually explicit images without consent in order to more accurately reflect its content. Madam speaker, in 2012, two Vermont teenagers were asked to participate in a commercial shoot for a local cable access station. One of the girls knew and trusted the man who invited them. He was her college professor. So the girls agreed. What they did not know and would not find out until six years later was that the man had set up cameras in a makeshift changing room that he then directed the girls to use. He recorded them, one 19 years old, the other 17 at the time, in various states of undress and uploaded that recording to a pornography website where it was viewed millions of times. When these two young women, sisters, learned through a friend that the video existed and was available on a porn site, there was nothing law enforcement or prosecutors could do to hold the man criminally accountable. Though voyeurism is a crime in Vermont, the statute of limitations had run out. In 2021, a 15 year old boy just a few hours from here in Canton, New York was contacted through Facebook Messenger by a person claiming to be a female peer. Over the course of a few short hours, the stranger befriended this teenager and eventually convinced him to send her nude images of himself. As soon as the photos were sent, the tone of these messages changed dramatically, and the person demanded money in order to keep the photos private. If the teen did not pay what was asked, the girl said she would send the nudes to everyone he knew. Caught in what seemed like a truly impossible situation, this young person ended his life. The person demanding money was not a teenage girl, but a sextortionist located on a different continent. This story repeats itself over and over and over again. Our committee heard testimony that stories just like this play out in Vermont on a weekly basis. Mercifully, they do not always end in suicide, but the harm can still last forever. I share these real life examples to emphasize just how vital it is that we pass laws to address the rising risk of harm caused by advances in and access to technology. H six twenty six is one step of many that we must take, but it is an important one. Our committee heard testimony from a long list of witnesses that I have available here for viewing, and our committee vote was ten zero one. We ask for the body's support.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The question is, shall the bill be amended as recommended by the committee on judiciary member from Northfield?

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Madam speaker, I think this is a very important bill with important issues it's addressing. I do have some questions for clarification on a few pieces and and also one area of concern that I wanna raise. So, madam speaker, if I may start, by interrogating the member from Pittsburgh.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The member from Pittsburgh is interrogated.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Madam speaker, it it appears that the only, really new language rather than reorganization, if I'm if I'm reading it correctly, is, that when it's discussing unlawful viewing and photography and so forth, it previously identifies in a place where the person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and it's adding under circumstances in which the person has an expectation of privacy. And I'm just wondering if the member could explain the distinction and maybe what an example would be of a circumstance, that was not related to a place with a reasonable expectation of privacy.

[Representative Michael "Mike" Southworth]: Madam speaker, I'm gonna yield to the, member from Williston.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The member from Pittsburgh yields to the member from Williston.

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: Thank you, madam speaker, and thank you, for the question. I would use as an as an example, the circumstances that led to the case that I described, the sisters in that case, were in a place, where they it was really the circumstances under which they found themselves where they should have had a reasonable expectation of privacy because they were in a changing room.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: So, madam speaker, that would not be considered a place where the person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy if they're in a changing room?

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: I'm sorry. Member, could you repeat the question?

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Madam speaker, is the member saying that a changing room would not be a place where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy?

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: I might ask for a brief recess to consult with legislative council.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The house will stand in recess for a couple minute. Will the house please come to order and members kindly take their seats? Member from Williston.

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: Thank you for the recess. So I was reminded of a wonderful example providing a illuminating the the distinction. So, picture a large, open changing room, at a department store, for example, where, I wouldn't have a reasonable expectation, of you know, that someone would be photographing me, under the circumstance that I'm changing in and out of clothing. And place and circumstance are both, defined earlier in in the bill. I can, under section one twenty six zero five voyeurism, circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, if I may quote from the statute, means circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that the person's intimate areas would not be visible to the public regardless of whether that person is in a public or private area.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: I thank the member, madam speaker for that clarification. The the second area is just getting a little clarity or making sure I wasn't missing the one or two pieces I did see. The distinction between disclosure under this current section, which is e, subsection e, and disclosure under section 2,606 B1 which is on page three sixty one. So both of them are about disclosure of images that were taken, but we have two separate statutes. And it appears to me that a key difference is that the first one on page three fifty nine would only apply to the person who took the recording or the photograph, and the second one applies to anyone who may have possession of it and who discloses it to someone else. Is that correct or is there actually a different substantive distinction?

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: Could the member direct me to the second reference? I'm looking at three

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: So on page, three Mhmm. 59 the middle of the page is this is the offensive of display or disclosure to a third party. And on page well, beginning on page, 61, I mean, the title is is disclosure without consent. Of course, both of them are without consent. So going down to b one, no person shall knowingly disclose a visual image. And, you know, there's there's a little bit of of language that's different in each, but I'm just wondering, substantively, if you know, why why there are these two pieces of statute that seem to cover the same basic offense?

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: Well, would note that the definition can be found in twenty six zero six a one which you sorry. Yeah. So as you're pointing to as the member points to disclose includes transfer, publish, distribute, exhibit, or reproduce. So as used in twenty six zero six, that is the definition of disclose or disclosure.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Thank you, madam speaker. But but as applied to page, I'm sorry, the the earlier statute, which is section twenty six zero five. Mhmm. Again, it seems very similar. It's talking about disclosure of a photograph filming or recorded which would also mean reproducing. I'm just they seem like they overlap an awful lot and I'm wondering if there was an intentional decision to not sort of combine them since they're overlapping and so similar.

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: I am going to say that we did intentionally break out we divided up the voyeurism statute a bit so that we could apply different statutes of limitation based on the nature of the type of voyeurism. And so because of that breaking apart, we are using the word disclose a couple of different times, but there's no there was no intent to, I guess, no intent to, break them out for oh, excuse me, intent. Hold on one second. We're employing the plain language meaning. The difference between twenty six zero five and twenty six zero six is that twenty six zero five is a picture without consent and twenty six zero six consent may have been given initially to take the photograph or produce the photograph, but not to disclose. There was no permission to disclose. So the intent to harm is what's required for the this crime in twenty six zero six, but it is not required in '25 twenty six zero five.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Thank you, madam speaker. I guess that's helpful. They both do say without the person's consent. So that that's appears to be the same. Thank you. That's I think it makes it a very confusing construct. But so, third question I had actually sort of relates in terms of the differences. The other major difference seems to be that what might colloquially referred to as you know, someone's private parts in terms of of what type of disclosure might be and on page 2,605, I'm sorry, on page 20 page three fifty nine section 2,605. Intimate area means naked or under clad undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks or female breast of a person which is significantly broader than for the disclosure under 2,606 which is on page three sixty one where nude is very narrow and very specific to I think what people would agree are the most private areas. Was that discussed? Was that an intentional keeping the same definitions in those different pace places because I I I realized it's a different reporter of the bill, but the new section on sexual extortion also uses the, the meaning, the nude from section twenty six zero six rather than intimate areas. So I'm just wondering if that was an intentional, why that was or or not intentional? If I am understanding correctly, the answer is yes.

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: It was intentional because twenty six zero five is intended to and was crafted originally really to capture the case of what we used to call a peeping tom, you know, peering into somebody's window, then they that person, you know, peeping into your window and and into a person's window and they're wearing their underwear or undergarments. And so it is capturing that behavior that might include somewhat less intimate by some measure state of being.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Thank you for clarifying that and yet I look at it and as that part of the statute is now outlined it, it also is talking about disclosure, and it has actually, a more significant, penalty in terms of length of imprisonment and fine. And yet it includes a broader definition which people might think is a less severe invasion of privacy. Was that discussed at all? Or

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: Madam speaker, are you referring to the, penalties for voyeurism in section twenty six zero five or twenty six zero six?

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Well, both. The one for on page three sixty, the penalty disclosing to a third party an image in violation, which means the intimate area definition, is not more than five years or more than $5,000 but for for the second section, switch back to that page. For on page three sixty one, but also the definition that's used for sextortion, both use the much narrower definition and they would seem to be you know, I I I'm just wondering if that was a conscious division because again, it's it seems to make the whole construct of the statute really confusing.

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: The committee discussed penalties, quite extensively, and, we were very deliberate, in crafting or including stricter penalties for violations that include, a lack of consent, images, you know, initially created without consent, but then you get to images that could have been created with consent and then shared without consent. And so the penalty increases for sharing sharing those images without consent regardless of whether they were created initially with consent or not. And and then as you see, we took into account the age of of the victim.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Think I think the member. I I I wanted in terms of that different definition of the area that's that one wants to keep private. Because the first one, page three fifty eight for section 2,505 is the much broader one, I was wondering about the use of and I I recognize this is this is the existing law, the existing definition, but there is a change now in the ramifications of of a violation. So, I'm wondering about the the inclusion of undergarment clad, which there doesn't appear to be a definition of. Was was it was the issue of a definition for that discussed? No. Madam speaking, what would the member's interpretation be of, undergarment clad? The member's interpretation would be a body with undergarments on it. K. Did the committee have a discussion about, degrees of invasion of privacy, depending on whether a person was not clothed at all or undergarment clad? No. Would the member be surprised to know that, one of the, quote, commonly recognized undergarments is long johns?

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: No.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: And so, madam speaker, the the member would would, support the idea of of prison term and so forth for, disclosing, disclosing a picture, of someone in their long johns? The member would support the idea of appropriate penalties for an incredible invasion of privacy regardless

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: of whether there are undergarments involved or not.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: I think the member. I some of my other questions deal with the criminal prosecution, and I believe that was if I may interrogate the member from Williston.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The member from Williston is interrogated.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Madam speaker, I was looking at the various categories which are all although one part's amended, they're all included, think, because of some technical corrections. But helpfully they're all there in section four on page three sixty four. Essentially, when we look at categories of limits on prosecution, the statute of limitations. We've got three years is sort of the base level of the default. Any misdemeanor or felony unless otherwise specified is a three year statute of limitations. And then we have six years, eleven years, and then we jump to forty years, and then a small category of any time, like homicide. And as I look through them, we can see that the let me get to that page that I just referenced. So we can see that the area where it's, there's any time at all is the most extreme: aggravated sexual assault, human trafficking, murder, manslaughter, so forth. Then six years, lewd and lascivious conduct, sexual abuse of the vulnerable default, embezzlement, forgery, and so forth. We go to and I'm sorry, jumping to d, but in order of the length of the statute, it's eleven years for arson and first degree aggravated domestic assault. When we look at the other existing categories for the forty year statute of limitations, the first one is lewd and lascivious conduct for a child under 18, maiming lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under another chapter. We continue with sexual exploitation of children, sexual exploitation of a vulnerable adult, And then we go to adding voyeurism involving photographing or filming, such as a person in their long johns, and then also disclosure display, and disclosure disclosure without consent and sexual extort exhortation extortion. Sorry. And and I'm just wondering if the committee had any discussion of proportionality in terms of the overall decisions of the legislature about how far back prosecutions should be allowed for various crimes.

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: The committee did have a fair bit of discussion about, appropriate statutes of limitation and the and the, sort of policy goal behind such statutes of limitation. And in the cases of voyeurism involving photographing, filming, recording, voyeurism involving display or disclosure, disclosure of sexually explicit images without consent, and sexual extortion, one of the, main sort of, factual elements that we discussed was the fact that, these images the creation of the images that the creation may not be discovered for quite some time, and, the the forever nature of those images, especially once there is disclosure for, to the committee's mind warranted inclusion in the forty year statute of limitations.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Madam speaker, if if an image was disclosed, at a sooner time even though the photography or recording happened long before, wouldn't the statute of limitations toll from the time of the disclosure occurring? In other words, it being published or shared with someone else?

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: Not with this change. That was yeah, not with this change to forty years.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Thank you, madam speaker. Yes. I understand that. But but under prior if it if it, if you did not have this extension, wouldn't disclosure of

[BetsyAnn Wrask (Clerk of the House)]: the

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: images if the disclosure of the images was within the past ten years, say, and it was a ten year statute of limitations, it wouldn't matter. You could still prosecute that even if the photo had been taken many years before. So the the concern I I recognize the concern. I mean, images like this can end up being disclosed at any time, but this is not just, addressing disclosure. Does that distinction make sense, madam speaker, in terms of the question?

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: It does. I believe we're discussing existing law, and the issue part of the issue one of the main issues being that, the statute of limitations currently begins with the commission of the crime, not the discovery. So even if the disclosure happens close to the creation of the image, the victim may not know that it was disclosed until well after the statute existing statute of limitations has

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: run out. Madam speaker, would wouldn't disclosure be a repeated, each time it's disclosed would be would be an offense? So even the person discovering it, that disclosure would would be within a much shorter statute of limitations unless it was disclosed years ago and, the victim was aware of it and and didn't bring didn't bring a complaint. Wouldn't wouldn't that be true that that the disclosure itself is a crime? So when whenever a disclosure disclosure occurs, that would be what would trigger the statute of limitations.

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: We did hear testimony that date of disclosure can be very difficult to discern, for that very reason, but we didn't hear any testimony that the discovery of the existence of the disclosure counted as a disclosure. So the victim is still, you know, learning about the existence of the disclosure well after the the disclosure and doesn't start, does not restart the clock with that, information.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Thank you, madam speaker. That's that's very helpful. Madam speaker, I wanted I wanted to discuss a little bit not as interrogation, but just discuss the issue of ex post facto law and statutes of limitations. They're different, but they can overlap or relate to one another. Ex post facto is talking about when something, if something was done when it was not illegal, in contrast to the statute of limitations is addressing when it was done that it was it was done when it was illegal, but the question is how far back can a person be held culpable for it. Initially, when I looked at this statute, I was very concerned about whether the criminal aspects violated that concept of you can't, in fact, constitutionally, go after someone for something they did when it wasn't illegal. And that concern was laid to rest when I talked it through with legislative counsel because that constitutional principle holds regardless of whether the statute explicitly says, well it wouldn't actually go back forty years for a specific crime if in fact it wasn't a crime at the time that you committed it. But I I think the general concept is is important. Why why do we have that in the constitution? And as the the Vermont Supreme Court said just a few years ago, it's prohibiting congress and the states from enacting a law which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed. In other words, people are entitled to fair warning of the of the effect of those statutes and permit them to rely, on their meaning. And going into that that crossover with, the statute of limitations, the the Vermont Supreme Court also referenced just in way back in in 1991 that in a question about whether a statute of limitations, it was distinguishing among whether or not the the extension of a statute of limitations, violated violated, it being ex post post facto. And I think what it quoted, it quoted from judge learned learned hand, who said, that this kind of a question turns upon how much violence is done to our instinctive feelings of justice and fair play. For the state to assure a person that he has become safe from its pursuit and thereafter to withdraw that assurance seems to most of us unfair and and dishonest. So, you know, the criminal aspect is protected from that concern. But when we talk about the civil aspect, if we're we're not talking about the constitution because that's about private actions, not state actions. But the sense of fairness, I think raises the same issue in terms of how far back someone can prosecute or go after someone for instance a youthful indiscretion. And particularly what if it was not illegal at the time and it became illegal later. Our values as a society change about inappropriate behavior and we can look back and say, we can see now how severely inappropriate it was. But at that time, we didn't consider it that. We didn't pass a law against it. And yet we are now saying that this person who violated this core core value of society as it is established now should be culpable under our current system of values rather than what was in place at the time that the action was taken. And when we look at the current civil law which is not reproduced the way the criminal law was but we look at civil law and the current statute of limitations, six years is actually the default amount of time for bringing a civil action. And most of 12 VSA five eleven which looks at statute of limitations actually are when they shorten it, you even have less time and that's for medical malpractice and then interestingly enough for some fairly significant things, it's only three years rather than six for assault and battery, for false imprisonment, and for slander and libel. Don't know why those were picked out and nothing else in terms of of criminal actions. But there's only one in statute which was recently enacted by this body. There's only one and that is for sexual or physical abuse of a child. Something that clearly was never legal to abuse a child. And we're adding today or proposing to add not just something about a child, but adding disclosure of images without consent to that level of not quite any time but but forty years. And I would note madam speaker that the interesting thing

[Representative Patricia McCoy]: is

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: that in 12 VSA which is court procedures, when we pass that statute changing the statute of limitations for child abuse child abuse and child sexual abuse. We placed a long section explaining that in the the law on statute of limitations for bringing civil actions. And I'm not sure, I mean I guess I do have a brief further question and this would be I think for the member from Pittsford. In terms of that decision to say that it can be at any time at all for these new offenses being added, Did did I miss any statutes other than child sexual abuse and child abuse that we currently have, no statute of limitations on how long ago it might have occurred.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The member from Pittsburgh is interrogated.

[Representative Michael "Mike" Southworth]: I would need to take a recess.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: House will send a recess for two minutes. Will the house please come to order and members kindly take their seats? Will the house please come to order? Member from Pittsburgh.

[Representative Michael "Mike" Southworth]: Thank you, madam speaker. We'd have to do a title statute search and we could get back to the member before the third reading.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Thank you, madam speaker. I guess that really leads pretty directly to my next question which is given that this section of statute identifies the other civil law areas for statute of limitation and given that we added specifically the one about child abuse and child sexual abuse, why wouldn't we also include this new change in a statute of limitation in one place so we didn't have to search the entire statutes to look for where there might be others? Was there a reason to not do that or

[Representative Michael "Mike" Southworth]: Madam Speaker, I don't remember us discussing a reason for doing that.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Thank you. I think my final question, and it is my final one actually goes to the member from Williston because it's about the extortion section.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The member from Williston is interrogated.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: Madam speaker, this is just another question about sort of consistency in how we're doing things in the statute. And the new civil actions that are raised in other parts, was there any particular reason why a civil action for sexual extortation? I don't know why I can't get extortion down. Why a civil action was not also included for a victim of sexual extortion?

[Representative Angela Arsenault]: The statute or the the the proposed statute as written does provide a civil remedy for victims of extortion as well.

[Representative Anne B. Donahue]: I thank the member. I will have to relook because I sort of hunted it down and didn't spot it, but I trust that it's there. Thank you, madam speaker. I really think this is an important bill, and I wanna see it move forward. I will be voting for it today, but I will also be offering a few amendments that I think will bring it more in line with maybe where it should be before third reading. Thank you.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: The question is shall the bill be amended as recommended by the committee on judiciary? Are you ready for the question? If so, all those in favor, please say aye. Aye. All those opposed, please say nay. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes do have it and you have amended the bill. Now the question is shall the bill be read a third time? Are you ready for that question? If so, all those in favor, please say aye. Aye. All those opposed, please say nay. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes do have it and third reading is ordered. Members, that completes the orders of the day. Are there any announcements? Are there any announcements? Seeing oh, member from Burlington.

[Representative Tiffany Bluemle]: Madam speaker, tomorrow night, the sergeant at arms and I are hosting a breads and spreads event in the cafeteria. I'll send out a reminder, but I just wanted to remind people tonight it's not too late to sign up to bring something. Thank you.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: Are there any further announcements? Seeing none. Member from Polkney, can you please offer us a motion to adjourn until Thursday, February 5 at three p 03:30PM.

[Representative Patricia McCoy]: Madam Speaker, I make a motion this body stand in adjournment until Thursday, 02/05/2026 at 03:30PM.

[Representative Jill Krowinski (Speaker of the House)]: You have heard the motion. Are you ready for the question? If so, all those in favor please say aye. Aye. All those opposed please say nay. The ayes appear to have it, the ayes do have it and this body stands in adjournment until tomorrow at 03:30PM.